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I. INTRODUCTION
“In that America, your new president could be a man who stands by when a
public figure tries to silence a private citizen with hateful slurs.  Who won’t
stand up to the slurs, or to any of the extreme, bigoted voices in his own
party.”1
Sandra Fluke, a Georgetown law student, spoke these words dur-
ing a speech at the 2012 Democratic National Convention (DNC) six
months after a radio news talk show host publicly made defamatory
statements about her.  In her speech, she was making reference to Re-
publican presidential candidate Mitt Romney, who did not denounce
the radio talk show host, Rush Limbaugh, who branded her a “slut”
and a “prostitute” on the public airwaves.2  This incident occurred af-
ter she gave testimony at a House Democratic Steering and Policy
Committee on the issue of women’s health and contraception.  Instead
of immediately filing a lawsuit for defamation, she used the DNC fo-
rum to publicly right the wrong committed by a media source as a
result of her civic duty.
From a legal perspective, Fluke was broaching her status as a wit-
ness at a congressional meeting as that of a private individual or pri-
vate figure—words commonly used in tort defamation law.  This
identification is important because, generally, a person considered to
be in a private individual category, under defamation law, is afforded
the opportunity to seek legal redress against the person or entity that
publicly defames her.3  Other category designations, outside of the pri-
vate individual category, usually have different burdens to overcome
before a remedy can be considered.  Thus, clarifying one’s status in a
defamation action is paramount.  So in this political speech, it was
imperative to all that Fluke safeguarded the notion that a private per-
son engaging in a minor task who participates in civic activities, such
1. National Journal Staff, Sandra Fluke’s Speech: Full Text from the Democratic
National Convention, NAT’L J., Sept. 5, 2012, http://www.nationaljournal.com/
conventions-speeches/sandra-fluke-s-speech-full-text-from-the-democratic-nation
al-convention-20120905, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/6G28-PNXW.
2. See sources cited infra note 4.
3. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B (1977).
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as testifying at a congressional meeting, should not lose their private
figure status.
The public defamatory comments about Fluke became a national
controversy that made the constraints of defamation law prominent.
Becoming the target of uncongenial and calumnious comments gained
her support from the general public and other news media personnel
who believed the vile attack crossed the line of media reporting.
Headlines were rampant in many leading newspapers.4  The contro-
versy even garnered attention from the President of the United
States, who defended her right to engage in issues she cared about
and to speak her mind in a civil and thoughtful way without being
attacked or called horrible names.5  The President said that he
wanted to send a message that being part of a democracy involves ar-
gument, disagreements, and debate, particularly when you are a pri-
vate citizen.6  His comments actually conceded the need for civic
responsibility and the importance of media restraint under the guide-
lines of defamation law.  In addition to the President’s support, the
true extent of the backlash against Limbaugh for his remarks arose
4. See Mary Bruce & Jake Tapper, Sandra Fluke: Rush Limbaugh ‘Slut’ Comment
‘Outside the Bounds of Civil Discourse,’ ABC NEWS (Mar. 2, 2012, 6:57 PM), http:/
/abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/03/sandra-fluke-rush-limbaugh-slut-com
ment-outside-the-bounds-of-civil-discourse, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/
R7BT-AV9G; Steve Frank, Exclusive: Woman Silenced at Birth Control Hearing
on ‘Ed Show’ Tonight, MSNBC (Feb. 16, 2012, 4:08 PM), http://ed.msnbc.com/
_news/2012/02/16/10427828-exclusive-woman-silenced-at-birth-control-hearing-
on-ed-show-tonight?lite, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/H3L-9X64; Todd Leo-
pold, Limbaugh Revels in the Crossfire After Fluke Comments, CNN (March 8,
2012, 1122 GMT), http://www.cnn.com/2012/03/05/us/rush-limbaugh-controversy/
index.html?iref=allsearch, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/4L68-UUMD; Jack
Mirkinson, Rush Limbaugh: Sandra Fluke, Woman Denied Right to Speak at
Contraception Hearing, a ‘Slut,’ HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 29, 2012, 9:26 PM), http:/
/www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/29/rush-limbaugh-sandra-fluke-slut_n_13116
40.html?ref=media, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/59R6-TU8U; Brian Stelter,
Obama Backs Student in Birth Control Furor, N.Y. Times, March 3, 2012, http://
query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9404E5D81639F930A35750C0A9649D
8B63, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/LSG8-9BDH.
5. President Obama said Limbaugh’s comments “don’t have a place” in public dis-
course. Obama: No Place for Limbaugh’s Remarks, WALL ST. J., Mar. 6, 2012,
http://live.wsj.com/video/obama-no-place-for-limbaugh-remarks/1A66A2B9-746C-
4D2F-B794-96694E66560F.html#!1A66A2B9-746C-4D2F-B794-96694E66560F,
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/RC6N-CWP5; Rush Limbaugh vs. Sandra
Fluke: A Timeline, THE WEEK, March 9, 2012, http://theweek.com/article/index/
225214/rush-limbaugh-vs-sandra-fluke-a-timeline, archived at http://perma.unl
.edu/3RRH-4QN8.
6. Obama: No Place for Limbaugh’s Remarks, WALL ST. J., Mar. 6, 2012, http://
live.wsj.com/video/obama-no-place-for-limbaugh-remarks/1A66A2B9-746C-
4D2F-B794-96694E66560F.html#!1A66A2B9-746C-4D2F-B794-96694E66560F,
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/RC6N-CWP5.
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from sponsors of his show, who cancelled their sponsorship as a means
of disassociating themselves from his potentially libelous speech.7
The public comments by Limbaugh regarding Fluke were calumni-
ous at best, hence the coined phrase: calumnious news reporting.  Ca-
lumnious news reporting is more than “yellow journalism”;8 it is akin
to the usage of vulgar, uncongenial, or denigrating expressions, which
are sometimes the norm in hostile working environments and in-
stances of racial harassment.  When calumnious language is used in
news coverage, it generally contains the use of “indecent” words—
words that are “beyond the pale” of what can be said in polite society.9
Such comments are probably outside the protection of the First
Amendment, in addition to being uncivil, insensitive,10 hostile, or
prejudicial (i.e., containing racial slurs and epithets).11  Such lan-
guage can be defamatory, as well as exceedingly crude.  In addition,
they may place a person in false light.12  However, for the purposes of
this article, calumnious news reporting will be used to describe a
method of sensationalizing the news by adding defamatory commenta-
ries, directly or indirectly, about a person who is incidental to a news
story.
Unfortunately, calumnious news reporting is on the rise in this
new era of continuous 24-hour news reporting on competing television
stations.  Calumnious or uncongenial news reporting by some news
7. See Leopold, supra note 4 (indicating eight companies, including AOL, Quicken R
Loans, and ProFlowers, announced they were pulling ads from Limbaugh’s show,
the No. 1 radio show in America); see also Rush Limbaugh’s Sandra Fluke Con-
troversy Still Hurting Business, Says CEO, HUFFINGTON POST (March 21, 2013,
10:05 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/21/rush-limbaugh-sandra-
fluke-advertisers_n_2923643.html, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/N7YH-
DGC8 (reporting Limbaugh’s remarks spurred over 100 advertisers and two ra-
dio stations to drop his show).
8. Media historian Frank Luther Mott listed some defining characteristics of yellow
journalism: prominent headlines that “screamed excitement, often about compar-
atively unimportant news”; a lavish use of pictures, many of them without signifi-
cance; faked interviews and stories; a Sunday supplement and color comics; and a
“more or less ostentatious sympathy with the ‘underdog,’ with campaigns against
abuses suffered by the common people.”  W. JOSEPH CAMPBELL, YELLOW JOURNAL-
ISM: PUNCTURING THE MYTHS, DEFINING THE LEGACIES 7 (2001).
9. Kingsley R. Browne, Title VII as Censorship: Hostile-Environment Harassment
and the First Amendment, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 481, 491 (1991) (describing vulgar
expressions commonly used in hostile working environments).
10. See id.
11. Id.
12. One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other
before the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other for invasion of
his privacy, if (a) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in
reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in
which the other would be placed. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E
(1977).
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commentators and news talk show hosts is prevalent against public
officials and public figures.  But, today, it has even transgressed to
private persons, hereinafter referred to as “civic-duty participants,”
who incidentally participate in minor tasks in furtherance of civic re-
sponsibility.  This reporting phenomenon is seen in hostile political
news commentaries or in political attack ads that use sound bites,
taken out of context, to mislead listeners into believing that the
speaker took a contrary position on a given subject.13  In other cases,
verbal attacks have been launched against civic-duty participants by
discrediting their occupation or personal life in an effort to place them
in a false light.14  And in other situations, attacks have been hurled at
jurors who were summoned to serve on criminal trials.15  Neverthe-
less, all of these victims in calumnious news reporting are civic-duty
participants who are responsive to the call of civic duty.  However,
when methods of sensationalizing news stories defame members of so-
ciety who undertake civic responsibilities that benefit our democratic
process, news commentators believe their best defense falls within the
constitutional privilege enunciated in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,16
and its progeny.
13. See Scott Finn, Should TV Stations Refuse to Air Political Ads That Make False
Claims?, NPR (Oct. 3, 2012, 9:56 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/itsallpolitics/
2012/10/03/162184983/should-tv-stations-refuse-to-air-political-ads-that-make-
false-claims, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/WH8N-QTX2 (reporting viewers
are seeing more political ads than ever before, but television stations only rarely
fact check any of the ads and even when television stations conduct fact checks,
that story is overwhelmed by a flood of TV ads).
14. See Larry Rohter, Real Deal on ‘Joe the Plumber’ Reveals New Slant, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 17, 2008, at A21, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/XW7V-S9MX (reporting
on Joe the Plumber, who set himself on a path to becoming America’s newest
media celebrity and, as such, suddenly faced celebrity-level scrutiny); see also
Zack Stafford, Hey! Stop Talking, You Woman! The Attack on Katherine Fenton,
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 18, 2012, 7:00 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/zach-
stafford/katherine-fenton_b_1979877.html, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/EJ
N6-FZQ3 (reporting a ‘study’ of Katherine Fenton’s alleged personal Twitter ac-
count, which, from the evidence, shows some tweets that have been presented out
of context, presumably in hopes of damaging her credibility in the public eye).
15. Headline News television host Nancy Grace used crude and uncongenial words
when she called twelve civic duty participants, who were serving as jurors,
“kooky” after they acquitted a deceased child’s mother of murder, manslaughter,
and child abuse charges. See Nancy Grace Discusses Casey Anthony Trial Verdict
on Good Morning America (Video), HOLLYWOOD REPORTER, July 6, 2011, http://
www.hollywoodreporter.com/live-feed/nancy-grace-discusses-casey-anthony-
208295, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/PSZ6-V4YN (reporting George Stepha-
nopoulos’s Good Morning America News interview with Nancy Grace after her
comment about the jury); Kevin Spak, Nancy Grace Defends Calling Casey
Anthony Jury ‘Kooky,’ NEWSER.COM (Jul 6, 2011), http://www.newser.com/story/
122753/nancy-grace-defends-reaction-to-kooky-casey-anthony-jury.html, arch-
vied at http://perma.unl.edu/P7RF-DC3H.
16. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).  The Gertz decision places great emphasis on the status of
plaintiffs as public officials, public figures, involuntary public figures, or private
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Because defending defamatory calumnious news reporting de-
pends upon the ambiguities of Gertz and its progeny as relevant case
law, the media is misinformed about status and privilege. Gertz and
its progeny take some blame for the vagueness in defamation law by
means of placing defamed plaintiffs in categories of public officials,
public figures, involuntary public figures and private individuals.  Ad-
ditional blame can be placed on vague federally mandated obligations
and vague judicial opinions.17  These ambiguities give the media a
perceived license to trample upon the dignity of persons who partici-
pate in our democratic governance and inform the media’s perception
of news stories that purport to address matters that allegedly are
“newsworthy,”18 a sort of code word for the public controversy element
that arises in defamation defense.  Hence, their authority, as the me-
dia would see it, is embedded somewhere in the constitutional privi-
lege recognized by the United States Supreme Court and the
precedent cases that blur components of defamation law.
This article, however, clarifies the status of civic-duty participants
by balancing the plaintiff category or status with the roles of civic-
duty participants and the precedent law, as defined by Gertz and its
progeny.  By analyzing the ambiguities of Gertz and its progeny with
the activities of civic-duty participants, this article asserts that the
media does not have First Amendment protection when it reports ca-
lumnious news stories that attack miniscule activities of civic-duty
participants when the original intent of the news article is actually to
censure another cause or public concern.  This type of reporting re-
sults in the civic-duty participant suffering collateral damage without
redress as the ambiguities of defamation law continue to mislead the
media.
Since Gertz and its progeny constructed and altered the category or
status of potentially defamed plaintiffs to define the media’s First
Amendment shield, a structural schematic will be used to help navi-
gate the maze these precedents left behind.  But first, Part II of this
article will illustrate a contextual background of defamatory speech by
the media regarding civic-duty participants whose activities were dis-
sipating and insufficient to be dispositive to an analysis of whether
individuals. Id. Clear distinction is made that private persons, unlike public offi-
cials and public figures, are not required to prove actual malice to win their libel
lawsuits, but prove only some degree of fault. Id. at 346.
17. See Drew Simshaw, Survival of the Standard: Today’s Public Interest Require-
ment in Television Broadcasting and the Return to Regulation, 64 FED. COMM.
L.J. 401, 407 (2012) (indicating there was a belief that federally mandated obliga-
tions were too vague and that proper enforcement would require too great of a
threat to the First Amendment rights of broadcasters).
18. See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 5:77 (2d ed.
2014) (indicating that unless privileged as newsworthy, the public disclosure of
embarrassing private facts is not protected by the First Amendment).
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media qualifies for the protections afforded in defamation actions.19
Part III begins the illustration of the structural schematic by offering
an overview of the precedent that created the criterion of constitu-
tional protection for defamatory speech.  This Part examines the ru-
brics of categories into which defamed plaintiffs are classified,
according to Gertz, and the modifications of the rubric, according to its
progeny.  In light of the evolution of defamation law, Part IV balances
some previously reported activities of civic-duty participants with the
trail of precedent law and the restrictions of duties associated with
civic responsibility.  This Part also explains why civic-duty partici-
pants are not public figures, but private figures.  Finally, Part V ar-
gues that the progeny of Gertz and its trail of ambiguity disturbs
neither status nor public-concern arguments when calumnious news
reporting targets civic-duty participants while performing civic duties.
II. CIVIC-DUTY PARTICIPANTS CAUGHT
IN THE CROSSROADS
In the mist of defamation law, civic-duty participants are caught in
the middle of the call for civic responsibility and constitutional ambi-
guities.  On one side, the design of the democratic structure of civic
responsibility is premised on national, state, or local service and civic
responsibility as key organizational features.  On the other side, the
ambiguities of defamation law evolved from the process of carving out
First Amendment protections for the media after the introduction of a
status-driven test, a content-based test, or some combination of the
two.20  In the crossroads lie complications for individuals simply seek-
ing to act according to civic responsibility who are sometimes blind-
sided as targets of calumnious news reporting when the original
intent of the news article is actually to censure another cause or public
concern.  This predicament must be addressed because acting in the
public realm is part of citizens’ social contract (e.g., paying taxes, vot-
ing, serving in the military and on juries, and obeying the laws, etc.),
yet most of life takes place (or ought to take place) in the separate,
19. Examples of cases where there is dispositive analysis of whether defendants
qualify for the protections of defamation law: a retired Army General who as-
sumed a public leadership role in a racial conflict, Walker v. Assoc. Press, 388
U.S. 130 (1967); a real estate developer seeking zoning variances, Greenbelt
Coop. Publ’g Assoc v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970); a candidate in the Democratic
Party’s primary election for U.S. Senator, Monitor Patriot v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265
(1971); a minister at the Universal Life Church, Hensley v. Time, Inc., 336 F.
Supp. 50 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
20. Joseph H. King Jr., Deus ex Machina and the Unfulfilled Promise of New York
Times v. Sullivan: Applying the Times for All Seasons, 95 KY. L.J. 649, 657
(2007).
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private realm of the individual.21  Accordingly, when the status of a
civic-duty participant is challenged to avoid liability, the law of defa-
mation must clearly and appropriately draw the line between public
and private status.  Additionally, the law must be identified regarding
public-interest determinations on when and how to limit media speech
relating to individuals that may unduly impact the viability of a claim
for defamation.  Thus, without clear guidelines, the message sent to
the citizenry is: stay in the private realm to avoid being a target of
social injustice through calumnious news reporting.22  This message
has the effect of chilling the democratic process and the social con-
tract.  This is not a good thing; a clear remedy is required in defama-
tion for those plaintiffs that are defamed while serving as civic-duty
participants, whether by choice or by chance.
While fulfilling their civic responsibility, civic-duty participants
are generally oblivious to being subject to possible defamatory attacks.
After indoctrination as part of a citizenry that places a high value on
civic responsibility,23 civic-duty participants express a willingness to
undertake civic duty without first contemplating incidental conse-
quences.  Similarly, they are also likely to subscribe to the founda-
tional belief that humans have one thing in common, the acceptance
and display of mutual respect by each person within society.24  As a
result of these ingrained beliefs, they likely cannot fathom defamation
as the repayment for their service as members of a political commu-
nity with a duty of civic responsibility as they attempt to contribute to
their government by doing what democracy invites them to do.25
From the defamation law standpoint, calumnious statements
about the activities of civic-duty participants are confused with the
21. Amitai Etzioni, Law in Civil Society, Good Society, and the Prescriptive State, 75
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 355, 363 (2000).
22. Lloyd T. Wilson, Jr., Following Transformation’s Thread: Reflections on the Citi-
zen-Lawyer as Transformative Agent, 43 IND. L. REV. 1091, 1103 (2010) (citing
MARK ROBERT RANK, ONE NATION, UNDERPRIVILEGED: WHY AMERICAN POVERTY
AFFECTS US ALL 19–20 (2005)).
23. See Paul A. Alarco´n, Recognizing and Regulating Home Schooling in California:
Balancing Parental and State Interests in Education, 13 CHAP. L. REV. 391, 395
(2010) (“[T]he state interest in an educated citizenry is a compelling interest in
ensuring that students become economically independent and civically
responsible.”).
24. See Fr. Robert J. Araujo, S.J., Humanitarian Jurisprudence: The Quest for Civil-
ity, 40 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 715, 717 (1996) (“Humanitarian jurisprudence considers
the law as an institution which seeks understanding of the views and concerns of
all people.  This jurisprudence attempts to realize its goal by arguing that a just
society is founded on the realization that people have much in common, especially
their mutual claims to the same human rights.”).
25. See David Copp, Corrective Justice as a Duty of the Political Community: David
Lyons on the Moral Legacy of Slavery and Jim Crow, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1731, 1754
(2010) (stating “members of a political community have a duty of civic responsi-
bility to contribute to their government’s doing what justice requires”).
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public concern defense, and those participants’ fleeting involvement in
the activity is confused with the status categories of Gertz and its
progeny.  This legal entrapment can occur even when civic-duty par-
ticipants are not at the center of a public controversy but, rather, are
merely incidental to the media stories.  Evidence of civic-duty partici-
pants trapped in this junction has become visible and problematic on
more than one occasion.  In fact, four noteworthy examples of media
speech relating to civic-duty participants, whose status may not fit
squarely within the parameters of defamation law and whose involve-
ment in a controversy does not fit squarely within public concern,
have occurred in the last four years.
Brandishing a civic-duty participant a slut and a prostitute after
participating in a congressional committee hearing is one example of
the media failing to distinguish between defamation’s canons of public
concern and plaintiff status.  Sandra Fluke, a civic-duty participant,
paid a high price for accepting an invitation to deliver testimony
before the Democratic Steering and Policy Committee.  Members of
the committee invited her to an unofficial hearing to present data on
how excluding Catholic universities and other religious institutions
from having to cover birth control under the new healthcare law would
impact students.26  Six days after her testimony, Rush Limbaugh, a
national radio talk show personality who speaks on news and political
topics,27 used her comments to label her a slut.  He said:
What does it say about the college co-ed Sandra Fluke, who goes before a con-
gressional committee and essentially says that she must be paid to have sex,
what does that make her?  It makes her a slut, right?  It makes her a prosti-
tute.  She wants to be paid to have sex.  She’s having so much sex she can’t
afford the contraception.  She wants you and me and the taxpayers to pay her
to have sex.  What does that make us?  We’re the pimps.28
By claiming that Sandra Fluke was asking the government to subsi-
dize her sex life, Rush Limbaugh refocused the public controversy
from the notion that the President was launching a “war on religion”
to students wanting the government to pay for sex.  This was a dis-
traction from the original intent of the public-concern controversy.  He
also made further defamatory remarks about Fluke, saying:
Can you imagine if you were her parents how proud . . . you would be? . . . .
Your daughter . . . testifies she’s having so much sex she can’t afford her own
birth control pills and she wants President Obama to provide them, or the
Pope.29
26. Press Release, Rep. Nancy Pelosi, House Democratic Steering and Policy Comm.
Hearing on Women’s Health (Feb. 23, 2012), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/
R5WW-VQA5.
27. RUSH LIMBAUGH, THE WAY THINGS OUGHT TO BE 30 (1992) (indicating he shares
with the audience an item from the news on any one of a variety of cultural and
political topics).
28. See Bruce & Tapper, supra note 4 (repeating words spoken by Rush Limbaugh). R
29. Mirkinson, supra note 4 (internal quotation marks omitted). R
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When a news commentator calls civic-duty participant jurors
“kooky” on a news show, it is yet another noteworthy example of me-
dia’s calumnious news reporting disparaging civic-duty participants.
Although it may be debatable whether the term “kooky” is a defama-
tory utterance, there is some argument that it may diminish the re-
spect, goodwill, confidence, or esteem of the targeted group.  It is also
a statement used by the media that fits squarely within the junction
between public concern and status of the plaintiff.  In this instance,
these words were used after the verdict of the State v. Anthony trial.
The trial drew attention from local spectators and national news.
However, unlike other news coverage, Headline News host Nancy
Grace hurled character assassinations at defendant Casey Anthony,
who had been charged with murdering her two-year-old daughter,
Caylee Anthony.30  But, more importantly, after the verdict, Grace di-
minished the goodwill of the jury by her uncongenial news reporting,
not because she was reacting to the outcome of the verdict but as a
defense for her news-reporting tactics during the trial.  When asked
by a news broadcast host about her coverage of the trial, her com-
ments included these statements:
George, I tell the truth.  Am I taking the heat for it?  Yeah.  Is that gonna
make me stop looking for missing children and trying to solve unsolved homi-
cides?  No.  I’m not going to let some kooky jury stop justice.  Not for me
anyway.31
Because her comments on the jurors’ verdict were even more mali-
cious than her remarks about the trial itself, her calumnious news re-
porting caused public attention.32  She not only disparaged the
accused and attacked the verdict, which was the main public-interest
story, but she demonized the defense and delegitimized the jury.33
Her comment, although it may not be provable as a false assertion,
even sparked a new controversy among media outlets concerning not
the trial or the outcome but, rather, the calumnious reporting tactics
regarding the jury, which recast the jury as the focus of ridicule and
animosity.34
30. See Nancy Grace Discusses Casey Anthony Trial Verdict, supra note 15; Spak, R
supra note 15. R
31. Nancy Grace Discusses Casey Anthony Trial Verdict, supra note 15 (reporting R
George Stephanopoulos’s Good Morning America news interview with Nancy
Grace after her comment about the jury).
32. James Poniewozik, Dead Tree Alert: Avenging Grace, TIME, July 8, 2011, at 61,
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/9KY2-9HA3.
33. Id.
34. See, e.g., Casey Anthony Jurors Explain Not Guilty Verdict, INSIDE EDITION (July
7, 2011), http://www.insideedition.com/headlines/2711-casey-anthony-jurors-ex
plain-not-guilty-verdict, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/NQR2-LTJZ?type=
image (recording a juror saying, “I think a lot of things she says just fuel the fire
and they’re based on nothing. It’s not fit for television.”); John Hudson, Nancy
Grace Under Fire: ‘The Devil Is Dancing,’ WIRE (July 6, 2011, 9:41 AM), http://
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Calumnious news reporting also affects civic-duty participants by
encouraging media to validate fabricated stories.  This type of delegi-
timization of a civic-duty participant materialized in a blogosphere
news story.35  Yet, unlike most news stories that start with a real pub-
lic controversy, through calumnious news-reporting tactics one re-
porter manufactured a news story about a person when the original
intent of the news article was actually to censure another cause.  In
this instance, the primary public controversy occurred after the Na-
tional Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP)
threatened to issue a condemnation of Tea Party activism by equating
it with racism.36  Andrew Breitbart, a political news blogger, an-
www.theatlanticwire.com/politics/2011/07/nancy-grace-under-fire-devil-dancing/
39616/, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/UB24-ZMZD (indicating despite her in-
sistence that she merely laid out the details of the case and drew a conclusion
that any sensible person would come to, a number of media critics are uncomfort-
able with what they see as her exploitation of the trial); Howard Kurtz, The Me-
dia’s Casey Anthony Shame, DAILY BEAST (July 5, 2011), http://www
.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/07/05/the-media-s-casey-anthony-shame.html,
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/73CT-RHPV (indicating the Nancy Graces of the
world are more interested in vociferous opinions—in her case, siding with prose-
cutors in almost every case—than in dispassionately weighing the evidence);
Llewellyn H. Rockwell, Jr., Ha Ha Ha, LEWROCKWELL.COM (July 5, 2011), http://
www.lewrockwell.com/blog/lewrw/archives/90829.html, archived at http://
perma.unl.edu/UBZ4-ZMZD (“The bloodthirsty Nancy Grace is denouncing the
jury, not only for their courageous verdict, but for being unwilling to go on TV.”);
Mary Elizabeth Williams, Nancy Grace Knows More than a “Kooky Jury,” THE
SALON (July 6, 2011), http://www.salon.com/2011/07/06/nancy_grace_caylee
_anthony_verdict/, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/7JRR-HJFV (“Whatever you
or I may think of the case, the fact remains that a ‘kooky jury’ found Anthony not
guilty, which means that Anthony now has, among other things, the right to not
be excoriated by a two-bit character assassin like Nancy Grace”); David Zurawik,
Nancy Grace Outdoes Herself with Talk of Devil Dancing, BALTIMORE SUN, July 5,
2011, http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2011-07-05/news/bal-nancy-grace-dancing-
with-the-devil-casey-anthony-20110705_1_nancy-grace-casey-anthony-trial-
devil, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/C38E-E7Z3 (“I look at Grace on this video,
and I have no problem understanding why so many hate the media so much.”)
35. Sean P. Trende, Defamation, Anti-SLAPP Legislation, and the Blogosphere: New
Solutions for an Old Problem, 44 DUQ. L. REV. 607, 608 (2006). (“ ‘[B]logs’ are
typically run by small, unincorporated individuals, sometimes as a mere pastime.
Collectively, these blogs are known as the ‘blogosphere,’ and much as a collection
of water molecules can become a tsunami of unimaginable power, so too can the
collective power of the blogosphere wield tremendous significance.  Individual
writers without large corporate backing have signed book deals and made the
New York Times Best-Seller list, largely based on the readership ‘built from
scratch’ through their online writings.  Their power extends to politics as well—
blogs can reasonably claim to have brought down a Senate Majority Leader, en-
ded the career of a network news anchor, and defeated a sitting Senator and re-
cent vice-presidential candidate in a primary campaign.”).
36. Ed Morrissey, Breitbart Hits NAACP with Promised Video of Racism, HOT AIR
(July 19, 2010, 12:55 PM), http://hotair.com/archives/2010/07/19/breitbart-hits-
naacp-with-promised-video-of-racism/, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/5JXD-
JFN3.
35748-neb_93-3 Sheet No. 82 Side A      04/02/2015   08:48:02
35748-neb_93-3 Sheet No. 82 Side A      04/02/2015   08:48:02
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\93-3\NEB304.txt unknown Seq: 12 31-MAR-15 11:41
2015] CALUMNIOUS NEWS REPORTING 701
nounced that he would publish at least one video of NAACP members
cheering racism.37  He delivered on his promise by using clips from a
video of Shirley Sherrod, former U.S. Department of Agriculture Di-
rector of Rural Development in Georgia, allegedly making racist re-
marks as she gave a speech as a civic duty.38  Before and during the
video, these statements were made by Breitbart:
In this piece you will see video evidence of racism coming from a federal
appointee and NAACP award recipient and in another clip from the same
event a perfect rationalization for why the Tea Party needs to exist.
. . . .
We are in possession of a video from in which Shirley Sherrod, USDA
Georgia Director of Rural Development, speaks at the NAACP Freedom Fund
dinner in Georgia.  In her meandering speech to what appears to be an all-
black audience, this federally appointed executive bureaucrat lays out in stark
detail, that her federal duties are managed through the prism of race and
class distinctions.
. . . .
In the first video, Sherrod describes how she racially discriminates against
a white farmer.  She describes how she is torn over how much she will choose
to help him.  And, she admits that she doesn’t do everything she can for him,
because he is white.  Eventually, her basic humanity informs that this white
man is poor and needs help.  But she decides that he should get help from “one
of his own kind”.  She refers him to a white lawyer.39
Accusing Sherrod by means of an incomplete video to create a news
story was not enough.  Along with a nearly 1,000-word blog post, he
accused Sherrod of carrying out her duties “through the prism of race
and class distinctions.”40  He also wrote that she discriminated ra-
cially against a white farmer.41  The video on Breitbart’s website
turned out to be incomplete, and when Sherrod’s full speech was re-
vealed, it became clear that her remarks were not racist but, instead,
an attempt at telling a story of racial reconciliation.42  But, prior to
the reveal, Sherrod was ousted from her job—collateral damage done
by Breitbart’s attempt to use his own notoriety to sway the outcome of
37. Id.
38. Mary Clare Jalonick, Shirley Sherrod Defamation Case Faces Blogger Free-
Speech Challenge, WASH. POST, March 17, 2013, http://articles.washingtonpost
.com/2013-03-17/politics/37795462_1_andrew-breitbart-shirley-sherrod-defama
tion-case, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/7CG8-TYNP; Video Shows USDA Of-
ficial Saying She Didn’t Give ‘Full Force’ of Help to White Farmer, FOX NEWS
(July 20, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/07/19/clip-shows-usda-offi
cial-admitting-withheld-help-white-farmer, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/TA
3B-AH4G.
39. Andrew Breitbart, Video Proof: The NAACP Awards Racism—2010, BREITBART
.COM (July 19, 2010), http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Government/2010/07/19/
Video-Proof—The-NAACP-Awards-Racism—-2010, archived at http://perma.unl
.edu/Q8TC-NM6A.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Jalonick, supra note 38. R
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the controversial clash between the NAACP and Tea Party members
over allegations of racism.43
Calumnious news reporting by imparting facts out of context from
Facebook and Twitter is another illustration that positions civic-ser-
vant participants in the crossroads between public concern and status
categories.  That is what a nonprofit, online newspaper did.  The
Washington Free Beacon online newspaper attempted to overshadow
the presidential debate by seeking to harm the reputation and esteem
of a private civic-duty participant for being chosen to ask a question at
the presidential debate.  The Washington Free Beacon named Kathe-
rine Fenton a “certifiable party girl,”44 highlighted sexually sugges-
tive messages she had initiated,45 and conveyed the message that she
dislikes authority.46  The newspaper reported this after Ms. Fenton
simply asked a question to presidential candidates.47  The headline
read: Party Girl Debate Questioner Loves Joose,48 Hates Cops and Wo-
men Who Watch Sports.49
By imparting facts out of context from Facebook and Twitter ac-
counts in order to create a headline, the Washington Free Beacon on-
line newspaper made the fleeting appearance of Katherine Fenton the
focal point of a matter of public concern.  As a private person, her mis-
fortune was in attending the presidential debate, being called on to
ask a noncontroversial question, and receiving an answer that
43. See Brian Montopoli, Vilsack: I Will Have to Live with Shirley Sherrod Mistake,
CBS NEWS (July 21, 2010, 5:58 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-
20011263-503544.html, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/PR6Y-HJLN (reporting
the Agriculture Secretary Tom Vilsack forced Shirley Sherrod to resign as a re-
sult of an out-of-context video posted to a conservative website); see also Jalonick,
supra note 38 (reporting that “[d]ays after the NAACP clashed with Tea Party R
members over allegations of racism, a video has surfaced showing an Agriculture
Department official regaling an NAACP audience with a story about how she
withheld help to a white farmer facing bankruptcy and the video has forced the
official to resign”).
44. Stafford, supra note 14. R
45. Chloe, Well, You Did Dare to Speak in Public, So I Guess You Deserve This,
FEMINISTING (October 18, 2012), http://feministing.com/2012/10/18/well-you-did-
dare-to-speak-in-public-so-i-guess-you-deserve-this/, archived at http://perma.unl
.edu/6KBV-6T2J.
46. Stafford, supra note 14. R
47. Washington Free Beacon Staff, Party Girl Debate Questioner Loves Joose, Hates
Cops and Women Who Watch Sports, WASH. FREE BEACON (October 17, 2012, 2:18
PM), http://freebeacon.com/party-girl-debate-questioner-loves-joose-hates-cops-
and-women-who-watch-sports/, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/Y84N-4WWF
(reporting that the question she asked was, “In what new ways do you intend to
rectify the inequalities in the workplace, specifically regarding females making
only 72 percent of what their male counterparts earn?”).
48. Joose is a flavored malt beverage.
49. Id.
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prompted a firestorm for conservatives.50  But in reality, the main
controversy erupted when the Republican nominee stumbled over his
answer about how he would “rectify the inequalities in the work-
place.”51  He referenced becoming the governor of Massachusetts, say-
ing, “I had the chance to pull together a Cabinet, and all the
applicants seemed to be men . . . .  [A] number of women’s
groups . . . brought us whole binders full of women.”52  Because his
comments immediately went viral on the Internet,53 birthing a parody
Twitter account and a Facebook fan page,54 the Washington Free Bea-
con attempted to recast the original public controversy through nega-
tive publicity about Katherine Fenton, the civic-duty participant who
was chosen from the audience to ask a question.
In light of these events, current defamation law fails to adequately
provide a clear path to a remedy, and thus, many media outlets are
willing to misapply the status category of the defamed plaintiff, or
they identify the activity as one of public concern.  The solution in
evaluating defamation redress for civic-duty participants is to harmo-
nize the constraints of civic responsibility with the present deficien-
cies of defamation law.  This suggests that there must first be an
understanding that civic-duty participants are in a position to do lim-
ited activities that would contribute to enabling the government to ful-
fill its requirement.55  Second, there must be an understanding that
within the ambiguous meaning of plaintiff status classification, public
controversies, and situations where the involuntariness of the plaintiff
is at issue, the progeny of Gertz did not act to overrule Gertz. There-
fore, each factor must be weighed according to the contributions of
50. Randi Kaye, Tonight on AC360: Voter’s Equal Pay Question Leads to Smear Cam-
paign, CNN (Oct. 23, 2012, 7:05 PM), http://ac360.blogs.cnn.com/2012/10/23/to-
night-on-ac360-voters-equal-pay-question-leads-to-smear-campaign/, archived at
http://perma.unl.edu/RGT8-YU6L.
51. Maria Cardona, Romney’s Empty ‘Binders Full of Women,’ CNN (October 18,
2012, 5:24 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/10/17/opinion/cardona-binders-women,
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/83P6-MSPA.
52. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
53. Id. (indicating that the comment spawned Twitter handles and almost 300,000
people had supported a Facebook page about what a politically tactless statement
it was).
54. Marlow Stern, Mitt Romney’s ‘Binders Full of Women’ Comment Sets Internet
Ablaze, DAILY BEAST (Oct. 17, 2012), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/
10/17/mitt-romney-s-binders-full-of-women-comment-sets-internet-ablaze.html,
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/9KCN-SS69.
55. See Copp, supra note 25, at 1749 (“[I]f the government is required to do some- R
thing as a matter of justice or as a matter of rectifying past injustices, then office
holders, citizens, and other members of the general community are in a position
to do things that would contribute to enabling the government to fulfill its
requirement.”).
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precedent.56  In sum, the balance must include the civic-duty partici-
pant’s duty to the democratic structure with deference to Gertz and its
progeny.
III. AN OVERVIEW OF THE PRECEDENT THAT CREATED
THE CRITERION OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION
FOR DEFAMATORY SPEECH
The quandary of why calumnious news reporting is tolerable by
the media, regarding civic-duty participants, is because of the vague-
ness in the criteria related to the constitutional protection for other-
wise defamatory speech.  To further understand why calumnious news
reporting is endured, it is first important to recognize the evolution of
the constitutional aspect of today’s defamation law.  This includes the
U.S. Supreme Court’s struggle to determine the extent of First
Amendment protection.57  It also includes understanding the complex-
ity of constitutionalizing the law of defamation in light of the First
Amendment that has shifted the function and goals of common-law
defamation, perplexed the media, and left some private individuals be-
lieving they are unprotected.  Consequently, these complexities al-
tered several legal analyses of defamation law with regard to whether
the plaintiff was within the public official–public figure grouping or a
private figure group and whether the content of speech is of public or
private interest.58  As a result of these alterations, the Supreme Court
left uncertainties in defamation law.  While maintaining these con-
flicting signals concerning the defamed plaintiff’s role and content of
the speech in question, the Supreme Court failed to provide clear gui-
dance and has not abandoned the maze of confusion.  Thus, the Su-
preme Court deposited murky standards that permit the media to
embellish and sensationalize new stories to the point of defamation,
thereby causing society to become immune to calumnious news
reporting.
Owing to Gertz and its progeny’s attempt to develop clear guide-
lines, there are still some traceable areas outside of the confusion that
provide a narrow opening for plaintiffs like civic-duty participants to
seek legal redress for defamation.  They can only be seen by filtering
through the ill-defined plaintiff categories, the nature of the speech,
and vague guidance on public interests.  In order to reach these clar-
56. This must be done without consideration of the media’s claim of privilege protect-
ing public issues without regard to the status of the plaintiff.
57. See Arlen W. Langvardt, Media Defendants, Public Concerns, and Public Plain-
tiffs: Toward Fashioning Order from Confusion in Defamation Law, 49 U. PITT.
L. REV. 91, 92 n.1 (1987) (“The Supreme Court first recognized that defamation
law is subject to constitutional limits and requirements in the landmark case,
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).”).
58. Id at 93.
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ion areas, this section will trace the evolution of defamation law with
expanding structural schematics to illustrate the progression of the
law and reveal the crevice where plaintiffs like civic-duty participants
may seek redress.
A. The Rubric of Categories in Which Defamed Plaintiffs
Are Classified
The crucial matter of determining the status or category of a de-
famed plaintiff in a controversy was the first daunting task of consid-
ering how to balance redress for vulnerable persons and respond to
First Amendment rights for the press.  Starting with New York Times
Co., v. Sullivan,59 the Court set the wheels in motion to constitution-
alize what they thought would be the proper scope of the public-figure
doctrine.60  What the Gertz court did was advance the same goal by
identifying two main categories to establish a schematic of defamation
plaintiffs.61  At one end of the spectrum are “private individuals” and
at the other end are “public officials” and “public figures.”  On the lat-
ter side of the spectrum, the Court divides public officials and public
figures into three categories: (1) involuntary public figures;62 (2) all-
purpose public figures;63 and (3) limited-purpose public figures.64  In
doing this, the Gertz Court found the diversity of plaintiff statuses less
confounding than determining when a statement involves an issue of
public importance, but it did not provide a definitive test for determin-
ing status.65  In actual application, however, determining exactly
what makes a plaintiff a public figure has not proven to be a simple
task, nor did it free the courts from considering standards of proof.
The Court ultimately left behind a confusing nexus between the all-
purpose public figure and the limited purpose public figure.  This im-
59. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
60. Without a precise diagram for guidance, courts and commentators have had con-
siderable difficulty determining the proper scope of the public-figure doctrine.
King, supra note 20, at 668 (citing Marcone v. Penthouse Int’l Magazine for Men, R
754 F.2d 1072, 1082 n.4 (3d Cir. 1985)); see also Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publ’n,
Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (“Unfortunately, the Supreme Court
has not yet fleshed out the skeletal descriptions of public figures and private per-
sons enunciated in Gertz.”).
61. Foretich v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 37 F.3d 1541, 1551–52 (4th Cir. 1994).
62. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974).
63. The Court recognized all-purpose public figures from instances where an individ-
ual may achieve such pervasive fame or notoriety that he becomes a public figure
for all purposes and in all contexts. Id. at 351.
64. The limited-purpose public figure is an individual who voluntarily injects himself
or is drawn into a particular public controversy and thereby becomes a public
figure for a limited range of issues. Id.
65. James Chadwick, A Conflict in the Public Interest: Defamation and the Role of
Content in the Wake of Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, 31 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 997, 1012 (1991).
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passe resulted in modifying the rubric of classifications to focus on the
subject matter of the defamatory statements and other offshoots re-
garding language.  Yet, what was meant to offer clarity produced addi-
tional ambiguity.
1. Public Officials
The first case determining the matter of status or category of a
defamed plaintiff, New York Times, ushered a new level of complexity
to the constitutionality of defamation law.66  Not only did the 1964
New York Times case develop a category of a defamed plaintiff, but it
also reshaped the traditional requirements of defamation law into an
enormously multifaceted and demanding set of constraints as it bal-
anced First Amendment freedom of speech with individual protection.
The opinion also granted deference to the media in libel cases by seek-
ing to reconfigure fault within the confines of the First Amendment.
But more importantly for this discussion, the contribution of New
York Times to the determination of plaintiff status was the catalyst of
revolutionizing defamed plaintiffs.
In the New York Times case, the respondent, an elected Commis-
sioner of the City of Montgomery, Alabama, alleged that statements in
the defendant’s newspaper ad had libeled him.67 Although the Com-
missioner was not mentioned by name, he alleged that one of the
statements could be read as referring to him.68  Before Justice Bren-
nan focused heavily on the importance of permitting debate on public
issues, he acknowledged the general proposition that freedom of ex-
pression upon public questions is secured by the First Amendment.69
In paying deference to the importance of permitting debate on public
issues, Justice Brennan stated that there can be no denial of a
“profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may
well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp at-
tacks on government and public officials.”70  The Court then deter-
mined that constitutional guarantees prohibited a public official from
recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official
conduct unless he proved that the statement was made with “actual
malice.”71  The Court’s definition of actual malice resulted in the ele-
ment of falsity superseding fault.72  Thus, for defamation law, New
66. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
67. Id. at 256.
68. Id. at 256–59.
69. Id. at 270.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 279–80.
72. “Actual malice” is the possession of prior knowledge that the allegedly defama-
tory statement was false or the display of reckless disregard for the truth. Id.
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York Times was the wild seed of the constitutional garden, from which
ever-growing layers of doctrinal and decision-making complexities
sprouted.73
2. Public Figures
The New York Times actual malice requirement, with its First
Amendment protections and the narrowed fault standards, now ex-
tends from public officials to public figures.  In the case of Curtis Pub-
lishing Co. v Butts,74 the Court decided bifurcated cases on libel
actions that were brought against publishers by nonpublic officials.75
The Curtis Court considered status and held that the plaintiffs were
“public figures” because of the public interest in the circulation of the
materials, and the publisher’s interest in circulating them was not
less than that involved in New York Times.76  The Court further
stated that both defamed plaintiffs in the cases “commanded a sub-
stantial amount of independent public interest at the time of the pub-
lications; both, in [the Court’s] opinion, would have been labeled
‘public figures’ under ordinary tort rules.”77  Thus, the Court held that
“a ‘public figure’ who is not a public official may also recover damages
for a defamatory falsehood whose substance makes substantial danger
to reputation apparent, on a showing of highly unreasonable conduct
constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation
and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers.”78  In
addition, the Court extended the New York Times actual malice stan-
dard to claims by public figures.
Because the actions and views of public figures with respect to pub-
lic issues and events are often of as much concern to citizens as the
attitudes and behaviors of “public officials,”79 the court extended the
constitutional privilege to include them.  In declaring that the New
York Times standard evenly applies to cases involving “public men”—
whether “public officials” or “public figures”—the Curtis Court pointed
out that its decision would afford the necessary insulation for the fun-
damental interests that the First Amendment was designed to pro-
tect.80  Moreover, this case established that in cases tried after the
decision in New York Times, the Supreme Court should require strict
73. See King, supra note 20, at 652 (“New York Times planted the seeds of a constitu- R
tional garden from which ever-growing layers of doctrinal and decision-making
complexity have sprouted.”).
74. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 154.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 155.
79. Id. at 162.
80. Id. at 165.
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compliance with the standard it established regarding the precise for-
mulation of actual malice preceding falsity.81
In determining whether the New York Times rule should apply
only in actions brought by public officials or whether it has a longer
reach,82 the Curtis bifurcated opinion, however, was inconsistent.  In
the first case, Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, the publisher of a maga-
zine article accused an athletic director at a state university, who was
employed by a private corporation, of conspiring to fix a football
game.83  From these facts the court considered the issue of whether
the defendant magazine publisher engaged in unreasonable conduct
constituting an extreme departure from standards of investigation
and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers.84  It
was determined that the plaintiff had attained his status as a public
figure by his position alone since he previously served as head football
coach of a university and was a well-known, respected figure within
the coaching ranks.85
Consistencies with the first issue and ruling were not maintained
in the second half of the bifurcated case.  In the second case, Associ-
ated Press v. Walker, the issue was whether the plaintiff was entitled
to a public figure status when, at the time of the publication, he was a
private person who had taken command of a violent crowd and had
personally led a charge against federal marshals sent to enforce a
court decree and to assist in preserving order.86  This second case also
described the plaintiff as encouraging rioters to use violence and giv-
ing students technical advice on combating the effects of tear gas.87
The Court determined that this plaintiff had achieved public figure
status “by his purposeful activity amounting to a thrusting of his per-
sonality into the vortex of an important public controversy.”88  In spite
of the different activities of the plaintiffs, the first Curtis decision did
not serve as a predictive analysis regarding the ruling in the second
Curtis decision.  The first ruling spoke of a departure from standards
of investigation and reporting while the second was consistent with
New York Times.  The activities of the plaintiffs were too different to
warrant compliance with a single standard.  But more importantly,
the Curtis decision noted the term “public figure” includes those who
81. See id. at 165–67 (indicating the judge’s instructions in the lower court were cor-
rect in providing the jury “actual malice” instructions in accordance with New
York Times).
82. Id. at 134.
83. Id. at 136.
84. Id. at 136–38.
85. Id. at 135–36.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 146.
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thrust themselves into important public controversies89 as well as
those who commanded a substantial amount of independent public in-
terest at the time of the publications.90 This overly broad definition
invited subjective reasoning and, therefore, inconsistent analysis.
Unlike New York Times, Curtis reached inconsistent results by
measuring the plaintiffs’ activities rather than their status. Curtis
reasoned that both plaintiffs in the bifurcated cases commanded suffi-
cient continuing public interest and had sufficient access to the means
of counterargument to be able “to expose through discussion the false-
hood and fallacies” of the defamatory statements.91 Curtis erred on
the analysis because it did not sufficiently address the general issue
for these cases.  Instead of determining whether the New York Times
rule should apply only to public officials or whether it had a longer
reach, Curtis differentiated between two opposing forms of activities
of private persons and tailored one specific standard for defining “pub-
lic figure” status, which had no basis in analogizing the issue.92  Thus,
Curtis dismantled the guidelines in considering the impact of New
York Times on libel actions instituted by persons who are not public
officials and therefore caused anyone to potentially metamorphose
into a public figure.
While reviewing the subject matter of the defamatory statement as
a faint litmus test for determining public figure status, Curtis opened
the door to far-reaching interpretations for a host of public figure de-
terminations.93 Curtis identified two major characteristics of public
figures.94  Public figures were specifically defined as persons who ordi-
narily can gain access to the media to rebut defamatory charges and
who voluntarily expose themselves in a meaningful sense to an en-
hanced risk of defamation.95  Subsequent to Curtis, it was decided
that the consideration of a public figure is a question of law for the
court.96  The issue for the courts then becomes whether the plaintiff is
89. Id.
90. Id. at 154.
91. Id. at 155.
92. See id. at 163 (Warren, J., dissenting) (indicating differentiation between “public
figures” and “public officials” and adoption of separate standards of proof for each
has no basis in law, logic, or First Amendment policy).
93. Olympia R. Duhart, When Time Stands Still: An Argument for Restoring Public
Figures to Private Status, 27 NOVA L. REV. 365, 372 (2002).
94. See David W. Robertson, Defamation and the First Amendment: In Praise of
Gertz  v. Robert Welch, Inc., 54 TEX. L. REV. 199, 223 (1976) (explaining the Gertz
decision probably borrowed the class of public figures established in the compan-
ion cases of Curtis, 388 U.S. at 135).
95. Id.
96. See, e.g., Marcone v. Penthouse Int’l Magazine for Men, 754 F.2d 1072, 1081 n.4
(3d Cir. 1985) (stating that “[t]he classification of a plaintiff as a public or private
figure is a question of law to be determined initially by the trial court and then
carefully scrutinized by an appellate court”).
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a public figure with respect to the subject matter of the defamatory
statement.97  Thus, with this question imbedded, the Supreme Court
held that the following are public figures: a prominent local real estate
developer who sought a zoning variance that would affect his plans for
high-density housing;98 a former professional football player who
gained prominence for being involved in a major, well-publicized
trade;99 a Playboy playmate who posed for a photograph seeking in-
ternational circulation, and whose expectations were fulfilled;100 and
a candidate in the Democratic Party’s primary elections for U.S. Sena-
tor.101  Therefore, after Curtis, distinguishing the subject matter in-
creasingly blurred the effects of plaintiff status designation.
Debates transpired on how to distinguish the subject matter for
the various public figure classifications as well as inquiries into
whether the fault standards applied as a matter of content or whether
a public controversy was controlling.  In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,
Inc.,102 the answer focused on the content of the debate.103  Rosen-
bloom held that the First Amendment applied to state libel actions
when the utterance involved issues of public or general concern.104
The case then went on to determine a fault standard.  The Court re-
quired clear and convincing proof for defamatory falsehood when the
statement related to the private individual’s involvement in an event
of public or general concern.105  Thus, the private individual must
prove that the defamatory falsehood was published with knowledge
that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false (i.e.,
actual malice).106
3. Private Persons
In reexamining the public figure classification inquiry, the Su-
preme Court in Gertz107 repudiated its position in Rosenbloom,108 and
97. VINCENT R. JOHNSON, ADVANCED TORTS LAW: A PROBLEM APPROACH 218 (2010).
98. Greenbelt Coop. Publ’g Assoc. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970); RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS, supra note 3. R
99. Chuy v. Phila. Eagles Football Club, 595 F.2d 1265 (3d Cir. 1979).
100. Vitale v. Nat’l Lampoon, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
101. Monitor Patriot v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971).
102. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
103. Id. at 43.
104. Id. at 44 (holding that that the classification of status was a matter of content).
105. Id. at 45.
106. Id.
107. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
108. Debates on the various public figure classifications of plaintiff status resulted in
further inquiries beyond the matter of the status of the individual into whether
the fault standards applied as a matter of content or whether a public contro-
versy was controlling. Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. 29.  In Rosenbloom, the Court stated
that the First Amendment applied to state libel actions when the utterance in-
volved issues of public or general concern. Id.  Thus, it was held that a libel
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diverted fault and classification down another course.  In Gertz, the
defamed plaintiff was a lawyer who represented the family of a mur-
dered victim.109  The defendant was a magazine that published de-
famatory statements about the plaintiff.110  As a defense to the
defamation claim, the magazine asserted that the plaintiff was a pub-
lic official or a public figure and that the article in question concerned
an issue of public interest and concern.111  The court held that news-
papers and broadcasters that publish defamatory falsehoods about an
individual who is neither a public official nor a public figure may not
claim constitutional privilege under New York Times.112  The Court
noted that an absolute protection for the media requires a total sacri-
fice of the competing values served by the law of defamation.113  Yet,
in recognizing that the rationale for diverting the public figure status
rule would lead to an ad hoc resolution of the plaintiff’s status classifi-
cation, the Gertz court diverted classification on another course by es-
tablishing a broad rule to treat various cases alike, even when they
are distinguishable.114  In essence, Gertz expanded the schematic of
defamation plaintiffs into two spectrums.115  The typography sepa-
rated private individuals from public officials and public figures and
further created a separate spectrum for public officials and public
figures to include three types of public persons: involuntary public
figures, all-purpose public figures, and limited-purpose public figures.
The schematic would look something like this:
action by a private individual against a media entity for a defamatory falsehood
relating to his involvement in an event of public or general concern may be sus-
tained only upon clear and convincing proof that the defamatory falsehood was
published with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether
it was false or not (i.e., actual malice). Id. Classification then became a matter of
content.
109. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 325.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 325–27.
112. Id. at 339–48.
113. The Court held that when the media publishes defamatory falsehoods about an
individual who is neither a public official nor a public figure it may not claim a
constitutional privilege against liability for defamation. Id. at 332.
114. Treating private persons differently than public officials and public figures would
lead to an ad hoc resolution of the status classification.  The Court stated, “Be-
cause an ad hoc resolution of the competing interests at stake in each particular
case is not feasible, we must lay down broad rules of general application. Such
rules necessarily treat alike various cases involving differences as well as simi-
larities.” Id. at 343–44.
115. Foretich v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 37 F.3d 1541, 1551–52 (4th Cir. 1994) (indi-
cating the Court elaborated a typography of defamation plaintiffs).
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Private
individuals Public Officials and Public Figures
Involuntary All-purpose Limited purpose
public figures public figures public figures
Consequently, Gertz’s dichotomy of status offers disconcerting ex-
planations.  First, the Court determined that an involuntary public-
figure status may be obtained through no purposeful action of one’s
own but that instances of truly involuntary public figures are exceed-
ingly rare.116  The Court’s support for the claim that this occurrence is
exceedingly rare was unsubstantiated.117  The Court avoided applying
the involuntary public-figure status and failed to mention such status
again in the case.  Second, Gertz labeled two types of public figures:
the all-purpose public figure and the more common limited-purpose
public figure.  The all-purpose public figure was defined as one who
assumes a role of prominence in societal affairs.118  Some occupy posi-
tions of such persuasive power and influence that they are deemed
public figures for all purposes.119  The limited-purpose public figure
category, on the other hand, was defined as one who voluntarily in-
jects oneself into a particular public controversy, thereby becoming a
public figure for a limited range of issues.120  Yet Gertz equated these
two categories as public figures that stand in a similar position.121
This suggests that an individual could be deemed a limited-purpose
public figure if his actions related to attaining such status were volun-
tarily or, in some cases, if they were somewhat coerced.  Whatever the
disconcerting explanation, a structural schematic of involuntary pub-
lic figures, and all-purpose and limited-purpose public figures would
look something like this:
Private
individuals Public Officials and Public Figures
Involuntary All-purpose Limited purpose
public figures public figures public figures
exceedingly rare pervasive fame voluntarily
instance or notoriety for injects oneself or
all purposes and coerced but > a
in all contexts minimal role
116. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 351.
121. Id. at 345.
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The opinion then offered a confusing nexus between two status cat-
egories as it expanded on the disconcerting explanations.  In the face
of a totally unexpected event, the Court explained that, “In either
case[,] such persons, involuntary public figures and limited-purpose
public figures, assume special prominence in the resolution of public
questions, thus, reemphasizing active participation.”122 Gertz’s paral-
lelism between the two categories and the subsequent applications
throughout the case render the previous statement concerning invol-
untary public figures merely hypothetical.123  Thus, the above sche-
matic follows the application of Gertz but not the ambiguous language
of Gertz.
B. The Modification of the Rubric of Classifications
At first blush, the rubric classification appears to be user-friendly
for most cases.  Although in the past the Supreme Court was reluctant
to label anyone a limited-purpose public figure because its scope was
restricted,124 the two remaining categories were less difficult to ma-
neuver.  For the most part, it was presumed uncomplicated to distin-
guish private individuals from all-purpose public figures.  However, a
new judicial trend altered this straightforward methodology.  The
progeny of Gertz replaced the easy grid with a public concern or sub-
ject-matter debate, which was designed to trigger an analysis on the
determination of limited-purpose public-figure status.  This trigger
came with very little guidance regarding which matters are of public
concern, thereby allowing further ambiguity in the constitutional
analysis.
Causing controversy among the Supreme Court justices,125 the
Gertz rationale for distinguishing public figures from private figures
created internal discontent and more confusion.  Dissenting opinions
criticized public-figure designations and supported private-individual
designations.  Justice Brennan stressed that the Court must strike
122. See Christopher Russell Smith, Dragged into the Vortex: Reclaiming Private
Plaintiffs’ Interests in Limited Purpose Public Figure Doctrine, 89 IOWA L. REV.
1419, 1428 (2004) (noting the requirement of an active participation of the two
categories with different definitions).
123. See id. (noting that in the following sentence after the involuntary public figure
definition, and in the rest of the paragraphs, the Court focused on active involve-
ment of the limited-purpose public figure).
124. See Wolston v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, Inc., 443 U.S. 157, 166 (1979); Hutchinson
v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 134–36 (1979); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448,
453–55 (1976). See generally RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 2.08, at
2–23 (1993) (“In the aftermath of Gertz, the Supreme Court undertook a series of
refinements of the ‘limited’ public figure, consistently giving the term an applica-
tion more restricted in scope than the simple word ‘public’ might suggest as a
matter of popular colloquial usage.”).
125. The vote was 5 to 4 with Chief Justice Burger, Justice Douglas, Justice Brennan,
and Justice White filing dissenting opinions. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 354, 404.
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the proper balance between avoidance of media self-censorship and
protection of individual reputations when applying the New York
Times standard to libel actions concerning media reports of private
individuals and events of public or general interest.126  He believed
that voluntarily or not, “we are all ‘public’ men to some degree.”127
Justice Burger indicated that he would prefer to “allow this area of
defamation law to continue to evolve as it has up to now with respect
to private citizens rather than embark on a new doctrinal theory
which has no jurisprudential ancestry.”128  Justice White had the
sternest dissent on this issue.  He felt that the Gertz holding discarded
history and precedent in a rush to refashion defamation law;129
treated the First Amendment as if it were drafted to preclude a rem-
edy to private citizens against a damaging falsehood;130 rejected the
judgment arrived at by the fifty states that the reputation interest of
the private citizens deserves more protection;131 and abolished pre-
sumed, general, and punitive damages rules as to libels or slanders
defamatory on their face.132  Justice White warned, “[S]cant, if any,
evidence exists that the First Amendment was intended to abolish the
common law of libel, at least to the extent of depriving ordinary citi-
zens of meaningful redress against their defamers.”133
In lieu of completely destroying the categories, the justices, in the
progeny of Gertz, established a hybrid between category determina-
tion and the subject matter of the public controversy that, under cer-
tain circumstances, excludes private individuals from the analysis.
This was completed in the span of three years, through the opinions of
Time, Inc. v. Firestone,134 Hutchinson v. Proxmire,135 and Wolston v.
Reader’s Digest Association.136  The hybrid formula, however, has side
effects.  The formula, combining the status categories and subject
matter, both reinforced and narrowed the requirement for a defamed
plaintiff to be a public figure in a libel suit.  In fact, one of the cases
126. Id. at 361 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 364 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
128. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 355 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (indicating the important
public policy which underlies this tradition—the right to counsel—would be
gravely jeopardized if every lawyer who takes an “unpopular” case, civil or crimi-
nal, would automatically become fair game for irresponsible reporters and editors
who might, for example, describe the lawyer as a “mob mouthpiece” for represent-
ing a client with a serious prior criminal record, or as an “ambulance chaser” for
representing a claimant in a personal injury action).
129. Id. at 380 (White, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 380–81 (White, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 355 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 392–98 (White, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 381 (White, J., dissenting).
134. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
135. 443 U.S. 111 (1979).
136. 443 U.S. 157 (1979).
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mandated that the defamed plaintiff’s designation as a limited-pur-
pose public figure is determined if he or she has assumed the risk that
comes with being a public figure and had access to “self-help” to help
mitigate damage to his or her reputation.137  The Supreme Court
crossbred this concept by placing importance on the subject matter of
the statements in question.138  The condensed foci in the trilogy after
Gertz—Firestone, Hutchinson, and Wolston—mean the determination
of the limited-purpose public-figure plaintiff is now relevant only
when the subject matter of the defamatory statement has been evalu-
ated.  Therefore, Gertz modifies the structural schematic to expand
the limited-purpose public figure look something like:
Private
individuals Public Officials and Public Figures
Involuntary All-purpose Limited-purpose
public figures public figures public figures
exceedingly rare pervasive fame voluntarily
instance or notoriety for injects oneself or
all purposes and coerced but > a
in all contexts minimal role
+
assumed the
risk and had
access to “self-
help”
triggered when
the subject
matter = public
concern
In the trilogy of cases, the new rule demanded that the subject
matter of the public controversy trigger the analysis on the determina-
tion of whether a plaintiff is a limited-purpose public figure.  In Fire-
stone, the Court refused to grant all-purpose public-figure or limited-
purpose public-figure status to the plaintiff because the matter was
not within the meaning of “public controversy,” despite the new-
sworthiness of the reported matter.139  The issue here was whether
137. See Jeff Kosseff, Private or Public? Eliminating the Gertz Defamation Test, 2011
U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 249, 255 (2011).
138. See Smith, supra note 122 at 1430 (indicating that Firestone, Hutchinson, and R
Wolston reinforced and narrowed the Gertz court’s limited-purpose public figure
doctrine).
139. Firestone, 424 U.S. at 454–55 (1976) (indicating that dissolution of a marriage
through judicial proceedings “is not the sort of ‘public controversy’ referred to in
Gertz . . . .  Her actions, both in instituting the litigation and in its conduct, were
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Ms. Firestone was an all-purpose or a limited-purpose public figure
since her divorce proceedings with a wealthy member of society were
public records.140  The Court acknowledged that although Ms. Fire-
stone was the wife of a descendant who was an heir to a wealthy in-
dustrial family, she “did not assume any role of especial prominence in
the affairs of society,”141 and she did not “thrust herself to the fore-
front of any particular public controversy in order to influence the res-
olution of the issues involved in it.”142  In Hutchinson, the Court
refused to grant limited-purpose public-figure status to a research di-
rector and professor who received federal funds for projects once it was
alleged that his research was a waste of general public expendi-
tures.143  The Court expressed that Professor Hutchinson did not
thrust himself or his views into public controversy to influence
others.144  Here, the defendant publisher did not identify a particular
controversy that was so compelling.145  The Court concluded that, at
most, the defamatory statements concerned general public expendi-
tures that are shared by most and relate to most public expenditures;
they were not sufficient to make Hutchinson a public figure.146  In
Wolston, the Court refused to grant limited-purpose public-figure sta-
tus to a nephew of an admitted Russian spy who failed to respond to
grand jury subpoena, thereby subjecting himself to a citation for con-
tempt because, although they attracted media attention, the circum-
stances were not conclusive with regard to the public-figure issue.147
The Wolston Court noted that the undisputed facts did not justify the
conclusion that the defamed plaintiff “voluntarily thrust” or “injected”
himself into the forefront of the public controversy surrounding the
investigation of Soviet espionage in the United States.148  In summa-
tion, the post-Gertz trilogy placed primary weight on the controversial
content of the published information, followed by a secondary consid-
quite different from those of General Walker in Curtis Publishing Co. . . . .  She
assumed no ‘special prominence in the resolution of public questions’” (quoting
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974))).
140. Id. at 452–55.
141. Id. at 454–55 (citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351).
142. Id. at 453 (indicating Respondent did not assume any role of especial prominence
in the affairs of society, other than perhaps Palm Beach society, and she did not
thrust herself to the forefront of any particular public controversy in order to
influence the resolution of the issues involved in it).
143. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 135 (1979).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. If it were, everyone who received or benefited from the myriad public grants for
research could be classified as a public figure—a conclusion that our previous
opinions have rejected. Id.
147. Wolston v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, Inc., 443 U.S. 157, 166 (1979).
148. Id. at 167.
35748-neb_93-3 Sheet No. 90 Side A      04/02/2015   08:48:02
35748-neb_93-3 Sheet No. 90 Side A      04/02/2015   08:48:02
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\93-3\NEB304.txt unknown Seq: 28 31-MAR-15 11:41
2015] CALUMNIOUS NEWS REPORTING 717
eration of the plaintiff’s voluntary role in the event as the question of
law.
Currently, the required subjective determination of public contro-
versy creates an identity crisis for the application of the new legal ru-
bric of defamation.149  The confusion is causing some lower courts to
construe the public-figure status narrowly with regard to the public
importance of the published information,150 while other courts inter-
pret Gertz and its progeny more broadly.  For instance, one criminal
defendant was broadly identified as a limited-purpose public figure
because it was determined that the public had a need for information
and interpretation,151 while, in another jurisdiction, a criminal defen-
dant was not granted the same status because, from a narrow view-
point, his alleged crimes were not matters of public controversy.152
Likewise, in the cases of defamed musicians, one jurisdiction took the
broad approach and held that musicians who entertained at a political
fund-raising rally were public figures,153 whereas, several years later,
another jurisdiction held that a musician was not a limited-purpose
public figure because there was no public controversy where a radio
station aired a telephone call from a listener who asked whether the
musician had murdered his girlfriend.154  Additionally, conflicting in-
terpretations transpired because the subjective conclusions of pub-
lished information along with the plaintiff’s status required
determinations about the status of a plaintiff and, through some
unidentifiable measurement, the significance of the published
information.155
149. See Kosseff, supra note 137, at 257 (citing a significant problem with the new R
doctrine for defamation: as requiring both judicial inquiries beyond the compe-
tence of courts and subjective determinations based on the content of published
information).
150. See id. (indicating post-Gertz state and federal courts have found many categories
of plaintiff to be both public figures and private figures, despite similar facts).
151. Orr v. Argus-Press Co., 586 F.2d 1108, 1116 (6th Cir. 1978).
152. Thomas v. Tel. Publ’g Co., 929 A.2d 993, 1018 (N.H. 2007).
153. Rodriguez v. Nishiki, 653 P.2d 1145, 1149 (Haw. 1982).
154. Riddle v. Golden Isles Broad, LLC, 621 S.E.2d 822, 826 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005).
155. See Kosseff, supra note 137, at 257 nn.70–71, 73 & 76. Compare Marcone v. Pent- R
house Int’l Magazine for Men, 754 F.2d 1072, 1083 (3d Cir. 1985) (finding that a
lawyer representing a well-known motorcycle gang was a public figure because “it
is clear that the present case involves a public controversy”), Steaks Unlimited,
Inc. v. Deaner, 623 F.2d 264, 274 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding that a company is a
public figure because “through its advertising blitz, [it] invited public attention,
comment, and criticism”), and Blum v. State, 255 A.D.2d 878, 880 (N.Y. App. Div.
1998) (finding a professor involved in a tenure dispute to be a public figure be-
cause he “thrust” himself into the public sphere), with Imperial Apparel, Ltd. v.
Cosmo’s Designer Direct, Inc., 853 N.E.2d 770, 777 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) (holding
that the mere fact that [plaintiff] advertised its merchandise does not, without
more, establish it as a limited purpose public figure), and Gilbert v. WNIR 100
FM, 756 N.E.2d 1263, 1272 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001) (finding that a prominent com-
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However, since the trilogy of cases provides little guidance as to
what matters are of public concern,156 an analysis of limited-purpose
public figures also lacks guidance.  It is conceivable that the trilogy
analysis only works well when the plaintiff activates it by voluntarily
interjecting himself in a recognized public controversy,157 thereby ren-
dering himself as a limited-purpose public figure.  But, courts are gen-
erally required to weigh the amount of voluntary participation,158
which affects the outcome.  In doing so, it may be that the importance
of the controversy lowers the threshold for plaintiff’s involvement to
qualify as having “thrust” himself to the controversy’s forefront.159
This balance can, however, result in inconsistent outcomes.  For in-
stance, in the case of involuntary public figures, an individual may
qualify for a limited-purpose public-figure status if the nature of the
controversy is evaluated as a more central concern than the status of
the plaintiff.160  Or, if courts determine a controversy to be of suffi-
cient public concern, a private plaintiff may be found to be a limited-
purpose public figure, even though he or she has little or no involve-
ment in the controversy.161  Here, courts make this determination im-
plicitly and without structured analysis, leaving the determination
open to extrajudicial influences.162
In addressing this problem, the Supreme Court sought to define
public controversy,163 but the analysis formed the antithesis.  In Dun
& Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,164 the Court only de-
munity attorney was not a public figure in a libel suit over news reporting about
a murder investigation).
156. Smith supra note 122, at 1421. R
157. See King, supra note 20, at 669 (indicating, as is obvious from these two leading R
cases, that the common denominator in most cases addressing the limited-pur-
pose voluntary public-figure subcategory has been the requirement of a public
controversy and the plaintiff’s voluntary participation in it).
158. See Smith, supra note 122, at 1440 (indicating how courts weigh the public-con-
troversy requirement may determine the level of voluntary action they require
for a plaintiff to be found a limited-purpose public figure).
159. Nat Stern, Unresolved Antitheses of the Limited Public Figure Doctrine, 33 HOU.
L. REV. 1027, 1102 n.199 (1996) (citing Michael A. Bamberger, Public Figures
and the Law of Libel: A Concept in Search of a Definition, 33 BUS. LAW. 709, 719
(1978) (interpreting prior cases to suggest guidelines for determining a limited
public figure, including “the more significant the topic or controversy, the less
weight is given to the reputational rights of the individual participant”)).
160. Chadwick, supra note 65, at 1005 n.38; see also Smith, supra note 122, at 1421 R
(indicating if courts determine a controversy to be of sufficient public concern, a
private plaintiff may be found to be a public figure even though he or she has
little or no involvement in that controversy).
161. Smith, supra note 122, at 1421.
162. Id. at 1421.
163. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985)
(indicating the only remaining issue is whether petitioner’s credit report involved
a matter of public concern).
164. Id.
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fined what a public concern is not.  In Dun & Bradstreet, a credit re-
porting agency sent an incorrect report to five subscribers indicating
that a construction contractor had filed a voluntary petition for bank-
ruptcy.165  The construction contractor brought a defamation action
alleging that the false report had injured its reputation.166  The Su-
preme Court addressed whether the speech in question is a matter of
public concern.167  The Court held that speech on matters of purely
private concern is of less First Amendment concern.168  The Court
stated, “There is no threat to the free and robust debate of public is-
sues; there is no potential interference with a meaningful dialogue of
ideas concerning self-government; and there is no threat of liability
causing a reaction of self-censorship by the press.”169  Accordingly,
when speech is wholly false and clearly damaging to the victim’s busi-
ness reputation, no special protection is warranted.170  But more di-
rectly, the Court pointed out that petitioner’s credit report concerned
no public issue.171  It was speech solely in the individual interest of
the speaker and its specific business audience.172  Thus, without giv-
ing guidance, the Court merely recited precedent to the generic defini-
tion of public concern: “[W]hether speech addresses a matter of public
concern must be determined by [the expression’s] content, form, and
context . . . as revealed by the whole record.”173  So, while the opinion
did not define public concern, Dun & Bradstreet did add to the private-
individual-category structural schematic, altering its appearance as
follows:
165. Id. at 751.
166. Id. at 752.
167. See id. at 761 (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147–48 (1983) (holding that
whether speech addresses a matter of public concern must be determined by the
content, form, and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record)).
168. Id. at 759.
169. Id. at 760 (citing Harley Davidson Motorsports, Inc. v. Markley, 568 P.2d 1359,
1363 (Or. 1977)).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 762.
172. Id.; cf. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S.
557, 561 (1980).
173. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 761 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145
(1983)).
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triggered when in all contexts minimal role
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the individual assumed the
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speaker and its access to “self-
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triggered when
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matter = public
concern
The conundrum that ensued from the discontinuity left by Dun &
Bradstreet is whether there is another burden of proof for private
figures.  Having failed to define public controversy, the pendulum
swung to this newly established issue.  To address the newly estab-
lished issue concerning the burden of proof required by private
figures, Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps,174 deemphasized the
involuntary status of the private figure and attached the burden of
proof to the undefined public-concern challenges.  In this case, Hepps
was the principal stockholder of a corporation that franchised a chain
of stores. The Inquirer published a series of five articles whose gen-
eral theme was that Hepps and its franchisees had links to organized
crime and used some of those links to influence the State’s governmen-
tal processes.175  The suit was brought by Hepps and a number of the
corporation’s franchisees on the basis that the defamed plaintiffs were
private figures.176  The Court held that where a newspaper publishes
speech of public concern about private figures, the private-figure
plaintiffs cannot recover damages without also showing that the state-
ments at issue are false.177  Although the status of the plaintiffs and
the content before the court were similar to Gertz,178 the Hepps Court
did not highlight the involuntary status of these private plaintiffs.
174. 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
175. Id. at 769.
176. Id. at 770.
177. Id. at 778.
178. Id. at 769.
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Rather, what the Hepps Court offered was the indefinite public-con-
cern rationale of Dun & Bradstreet by tying its proof-of-falsity holding
to cases involving matters of public concern,179 without consideration
of status.
Recognizing that the current constitutional analysis of the defama-
tion doctrine has led this area of law astray,180 lower courts and the
media now hold various interpretations on the impact of the changing
law.  Their various interpretations are being applied to the detriment
of private individuals.  For the courts, following the structural sche-
matic is a start, but there is little to no direction on determining the
full analysis of the meanings within the chart.  While the Supreme
Court justices are still quibbling about the Hepps ruling,181 they have
not yet definitively decided when the speech at issue is a matter of
public concern.182  But more important to the private individuals who
are wrongly placed in the public-figure category is the matter of the
state’s interest in protecting their good name from the media.  The
Supreme Court has reached a pernicious end result by possibly de-
manding the lower courts create an ad hoc balancing technique simi-
lar to its unintentional model.183  At the same time, the media is
blurring the lines of the structural schematic by treating private indi-
viduals as public figures for sensational news reporting.
IV. THE APPROPRIATE EVALUATION OF DEFAMATORY
REDRESS FOR CIVIC-DUTY PARTICIPANTS
A dispositive analysis for defamation allegations against private
civic-duty participants must be syntactically approached with what
has been left behind by Gertz and its progeny when news stories at-
179. See Langvardt, supra note 57, at 104 (indicating Hepps perpetuated and, in dic- R
tum, arguably extended the public concern rationale of Dun & Bradstreet by ty-
ing its proof-of-falsity holding to cases involving matters of public concern).
180. See Chadwick, supra note 65, at 1061–62 (1991) (indicating the particular test R
adopted by the Court is less important than the recognition that the status-based
analysis in current constitutional defamation doctrine has led this area of law far
astray).
181. Hepps, 475 U.S. at 780–90 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
182. Langvardt, supra note 57, at 930 (explaining that this issue exists because of the R
Court’s abrupt conclusion that the statement in Dun & Brandstreet, a false credit
report that the plaintiff had filed for bankruptcy, did not pertain to a matter of
public concern; Dun & Bradstreet provided minimal guidance for making public
concern/private concern determinations in future cases, while Hepps offered even
less in that respect).
183. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 81 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(noting that the Court is required to weigh the nuances of each particular circum-
stance on its scale of values regarding the relative importance of society’s interest
in protecting individuals from defamation against the importance of a free press);
see also Hepps, 475 U.S. at 789 (1986) (Stevens, Burger, White, and Rehnquist, J
dissenting) (criticizing the majority for giving too little weight to the state’s inter-
est in compensating private-figure plaintiffs for injuries to their reputations).
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tack such participants, though the original intent of the news article is
to censure another cause or public concern.  Because civic-duty par-
ticipants are limited in their civic-duty activities by the constraints of
the entity they are involved with, and because they are not public
figures, their legal remedies are guaranteed.  As implied by Dun &
Bradstreet,184 the evolution of defamation law appears to alter the
category specifications for these civic-duty participants.  However, de-
spite the fact that the progeny of Gertz is comprised of confusing de-
terminations as to how much weight is to be placed on the public
controversy and confusion as to what public concern actually is, the
dissipating roles of private civic-duty participants escape the tradi-
tional outcome.  This is so notwithstanding the reality that Gertz, the
trilogy of Firestone, Hutchinson, and Wolston, and even Dun & Brad-
street’s holdings purposely limit the private-individual category from
the public-concern argument.  Thus, in applying the schematic above
with the proper evaluation of the roles of civic-duty participants, an
unadulterated result occurs.
A. Civic-Duty Participants Are Limited by the Constraints
of the Entity with Which They Are Involved
Unlike public figures, civic-duty participants cannot defensibly be
said to have voluntarily subjected themselves, by bare membership in
the body politic, to the potential for stringent scrutiny and utterly
damaging exposition of their private lives whenever their limited ac-
tivities are deemed newsworthy by the press.185  This is so even after
a majority of the Supreme Court justices agreed to extend the consti-
tutional privilege to defamatory criticism of public figures to include
nonpublic figures.186  That extension still does not incorporate private
civic-duty participants who are responsive to civic duties and engage
in dissipating activities because they are neither the central figures in
a significant public controversy, nor do they seek to publicize their
views on relevant controversies.  At most, they are private figures
among those individuals who, by happenstance, have been mentioned
peripherally in a matter of public interest or have merely been named
in a press account.187
Below are instances where the civic-duty roles of some private
civic-duty participants are limited by the constraints of the entity they
184. Dun & Bradstreet implicitly adds to the private-individual status category of the
schematic.
185. David Elder, Defamation, Public Officialdom and the Rosenblatt v. Baer Crite-
ria—A Proposal for Revivification: Two Decades After New York Times Co. v. Sul-
livan, 33 BUFF. L. REV. 579, 660 (1984) (referring to prototypical private persons).
186. See Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 335 (1974).
187. See Wells v. Liddy, 186 F.3d 505, 540 (4th Cir. 1999) (discussing the “exceedingly
rare” individual who can be labeled in involuntary public figure).
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are involved with, thereby precluding a dominant position in any
newsworthy event.  Some civic-duty role constraints are unique rules
within the entity, while other constraints are limited by formal or in-
formal judicial order.  Nevertheless, civic-duty constraints preclude
private civic-duty participants from activities that are more than
fleeting.
1. Routine Congressional Committee Meetings/Hearings
While testimony of private civic-duty participants help congres-
sional committee members collect information in the early stages of
legislative policymaking, this type of limited input generally does not
allow them to become intimately involved in the resolution of impor-
tant public questions.188  In the Sandra Fluke situation, after the
Obama Administration announced it would require Catholic universi-
ties and charities to include birth control in their health coverage, the
Oversight and Government Reform Committee scheduled a routine
congressional committee meeting to review the impact of this an-
nouncement.189  The meeting included a hearing.  Invitations were
sent to civic-duty participants from different faiths, and an invitation
to Fluke.190  Fluke was invited by virtue of the authority conferred on
the House Democratic Steering and Policy Committee members and
the minority members of the Oversight and Government Reform Com-
mittee.191  The Oversight and Government Reform Committee how-
ever, rescinded the original invitation to Fluke because the Chairman
believed her testimony fell outside the bounds of the agenda.192  The
agenda, according to the Chairman, was to hear testimony on whether
the new healthcare law would encroach on the conscientious objec-
tions of religious groups,193 not on the reproductive rights of women.
188. See Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 133, 164 (1967) (defining public figures).
189. Alex Altman, Sandra Fluke on Her Role in the Contraception Controversy: ‘I
Would Do This Again,’ TIME, March 8, 2012, http://swampland.time.com/2012/03/
08/sandra-fluke-on-her-role-in-the-contraception-controversy-i-would-do-this-
again/, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/QZE9-PX2Q.
190. Frank, supra note 4. R
191. See JOHN H. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTION, JEFFERSON’S MANUAL AND RULES OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE U.S. ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS, H.R.
DOC. NO. 111-157, at 563 (2011), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/LE2Q-5BHB
(noting that whenever a hearing is conducted by a committee on a measure or
matter, the minority members of the committee shall be entitled, upon request to
the chair by a majority of them before the completion of the hearing, to call wit-
nesses selected by the minority to testify with respect to that measure or matter).
192. Altman, supra note 189. R
193. Lines Crossed: Separation of Church and State. Has the Obama Administration
Trampled on Freedom of Religion and Freedom of Conscience?: Hearing Before the
H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 112th Cong. 3–4 (2012), archived at
http://perma.unl.edu/FA4B-S2GE (arguing over the fact that the meeting was not
about reproductive rights of women).
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After ejecting Fluke from the hearing, members of the minority party
took their witness and left the meeting.194  However, approximately
eight days later, the members of the minority party provided a plat-
form by way of an unofficial hearing, to acquire her input.195
Under the congressional rules for witnesses, civic-duty partici-
pants like Fluke are unable to voluntarily inject themselves or draw
attention toward a particular public controversy.  This process does
not, however, preclude a person of notoriety from becoming a witness
for congressional fact-finding, but the procedures are tailored such
that the participant can only provide limited testimony for policymak-
ers’ consideration.196  In this environment, the Chairman controls,
and the participants seldom are central figures in a significant public
controversy, nor do they have full control to publicize their views on
the relevant controversy.  As a matter of fact, the format and rules for
the House of Representatives, as well as the Senate, preclude such
interjection and influence.197  More specifically, the controlling com-
mittee only allows minority party members to call witnesses of their
choice on at least one day of a hearing198 to mitigate both influence
and controversy.  A civic-duty participant called by the minority party
is then “filtered” to prevent overwhelming interjection.199  So, prior to
hearings, a witness must be deemed “appropriate and qualified,” and
then vetted before being accepted by the committee chair as a wit-
194. Laura Bassett & Amanda Terkel, House Democrats Walk out of One-Sided Hear-
ing on Contraception, Calling It an ‘Autocratic Regime,’ HUFFINGTON POST (Feb.
16, 2012, 11:20 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/16/contraception-
hearing-house-democrats-walk-out_n_1281730.html, archived at http://perma
.unl.edu/HS5J-6SA9.
195. Pelosi, supra note 26 (noting that, after Fluke’s testimony, it was said by one R
Democrat that Fluke would stand firm in the cause of women’s health, and no
longer be held silent).
196. SULLIVAN, supra note 191, at 557–58 (indicating that witnesses who appear R
before it are required to submit in advance written statements of proposed testi-
mony and to limit their initial presentations to the committee to brief summaries
thereof).
197. See id.
198. Id. at 563 (explaining that whenever a hearing is conducted by a committee on a
measure or matter, the minority members of the committee shall be entitled,
upon request to the chair by a majority of them before the completion of the hear-
ing, to call witnesses selected by the minority to testify with respect to that mea-
sure or matter during at least one day of hearing thereon); see also VALERIE
HEITSHUSEN, SENATE COMMITTEE HEARINGS: PREPARATION 2 (2012), archived at
http://perma.unl.edu/Y4U5-F32H (noting how Senate rules allow the minority
party members of a committee to call witnesses of their choice on at least one day
of a hearing, when the chairman receives a written request from a majority of the
minority party members).
199. SULLIVAN, supra note 191, at 557–58 (indicating that witnesses who appear R
before it are required to submit in advance written statements of proposed
testimony).
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ness.200  Additionally, in some cases, it is a tradition, rather than a
rule, that the minority has only one witness that is appropriate and
qualified to speak on the subject matter.201  Therefore, whether the
committee title is “legislative,” “oversight,” “investigative,” “confirma-
tion,” or a combination of these, all routine hearings share common
elements of preparation and conduct to guard against any civic-duty
participant usurping a central role in the proceedings or creating a
public controversy.202
2. The Jury System
In the matter of jurors, they are individually and collectively con-
strained in their involvement by the rules for jurors enunciated by the
judicial system.  Prior to sitting on a jury, prospective jurors are ques-
tioned extensively through written questionnaires by the court and
sometimes by attorneys to determine whether they meet statutory re-
quirements for service and whether they harbor biases that might pre-
vent them from impartially deciding a case.203  Once part of the jury
pool, they are treated as though their rights to privacy evaporate, and
the refusal to answer questions on grounds of privacy may cause them
to be held in contempt of court and jailed.204  They are, therefore, re-
strained in their roles by stringent rules.
Even the random selection of jurors in generating a jury pool is the
beginning of limiting the involvement of a civic-duty participant.  In
federal courts, prospective juror lists were derived from voter registra-
tion enrollment.205  Voter registration lists were chosen by Congress
in part because they provided each qualified citizen an equal opportu-
nity to cause his name to be among those from which random selection
is made, and also because it was the largest generally available source
200. LINES CROSSED, supra note 193, at 35 (indicating to be deemed “appropriate and R
qualified,” a short proposed testimony by the civic-duty participant must be sub-
mitted to twenty-eight members of the majority party members).
201. Id. (indicating that the Oversight and Government Reform Committee noted it
was a tradition and not a rule that the minority have one witness that is appro-
priate and qualified to speak on the subject matter).
202. See Heitshusen, supra note 198, at 1 (indicating the legislative, oversight, inves- R
tigative, confirmation, or a combination of hearings that share common elements
of preparation and conduct).
203. Lauren A. Rousseau, Privacy and Jury Selection: Does the Constitution Protect
Prospective Jurors from Personally Intrusive Voir Dire Questions?, 3 RUTGERS J.
L. & URB. POL’Y 287 (2006).
204. See Melanie D. Wilson, Juror Privacy in the Sixth Amendment Balance, 2012
UTAH L. REV. 2023, 2035–36 (2012) (indicating because voir dire covers so many
topics, even jurors with no special sensitivity and nothing in particular to hide
sometimes worry about exposing their private information).
205. United States v. Cecil, 836 F.2d 1431, 1445 (4th Cir. 1988).
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that was frequently updated.206  Now, with the use of technology,
more inclusive and representative master jury lists are made possible
wherein state and federal courts merge two or more source lists and
identify and remove duplicate records.207  These lists, possibly derived
from driver’s licenses, property tax rolls, etc.,208 are all generated
from personal private data.  Today, the vast majority of state courts
and a sizeable number of federal courts have adopted the use of multi-
ple lists as the starting point for creating a master jury list.209  Pri-
vate individuals, without the opportunity to solicit for inclusion, are
among those to be chosen for a jury.  For that reason, the ability to
interject into a public controversy is prohibited.
Protecting jurors from intrusions resulting from calumnious news
reporting is not an argument to assert the existence of an actual right
of privacy on the part of jurors,210 but, rather, an argument that seeks
to honor the civic responsibility that jurors must engage in on behalf
of society.  It is an endowment that protects the integrity of private
individuals who have not recoiled before their responsibility, but have
answered a jury summons.211  From a legal perspective, the authen-
206. United States v. Hanson, 472 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (D. Minn. 1979), aff’d, 618 F.2d
1261 (8th Cir. 1980).
207. Paula Hannaford-Agor, Systematic Negligence in Jury Operations: Why the Defi-
nition of Systematic Exclusion in Fair Cross Section Claims Must Be Expanded,
59 DRAKE L. REV. 761, 779 (2011).
208. Id. (stating how forty-three states and the District of Columbia permit the use of
two or more source lists to compile master jury lists, of which thirty-one mandate
the use of at least two lists and eleven mandate the use of three or more lists—
typically, registered voter, licensed driver, and state income or property tax lists).
209. See id.
210. Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise I), 464 U.S. 501, 514 (1984)
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (declining to decide the issue, explaining how “[w]e
need not decide, however, whether a juror, called upon to answer questions posed
to him in court during voir dire, has a legitimate expectation, rising to the status
of a privacy right, that he will not have to answer” personal questions); Whalen v.
Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977) (finding a constitutional right to withhold matters
which are subject to a reasonable expectation of privacy); U.S. v. Wecht, 537 F.3d
222, 240 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting that “ ‘[w]e cannot accept the mere generalized
privacy concerns of jurors’ as a sufficient reason to conceal their identities in
every high-profile case” (quoting In re Globe Newspaper Co., 920 F.2d 88, 98 (1st
Cir. 1990))); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmt. d (1977) (“No one has
the right to object merely because his name or his appearance is brought before
the public, since neither is in any way a private matter and both are open to
public observation.  It is only when the publicity is given for the purpose of appro-
priating to the defendant’s benefit the commercial or other values associated with
the name or the likeness that the right of privacy is invaded.”).
211. Andrew E. Taslitz, Why Did Tinkerbell Get off So Easy?: The Roles of Imagination
and Social Norms in Excusing Human Weakness, 42 TEX. TECH L. REV. 419,
474–75 (2009) (citing ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 295
(Henry Reeves Trans. 1945)) (explaining that the jury teaches every man not to
recoil before the responsibility of his own actions and impresses him with that
manly confidence without which no political virtue can exist).
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ticity of the protection from calumnious news reporting is endowed in
the holdings of Gertz and its progeny requiring the plaintiff’s central
role as essential to recognition of status.212
3. Inconsequential Political Engagement
When private civic-duty participants are chosen from an audience
to ask political candidates a question at a public debate, they cannot
control the debate rules to establish pervasive fame or notoriety for all
purposes and in all contexts.  Such private persons are generally not
allowed to project their own image or views.213  This is certainly true
for Katherine Fenton.  In her situation, she was merely one of many
spectators in the audience who was selected to read their question to
the political candidates.  There was no known assumption of the risk
of calumnious news reporting or consequences associated with this
participation.  While her question triggered a candidate’s gaffe, her
civic participation, in and of itself, was not from the podium of project-
ing her own image or views to the public.
Civic-duty participants who are involved in dissipation or inciden-
tal political engagement are not allowed a dominant role when the
civic-duty course of action is preset.  Fenton’s case is a principal exam-
ple in which the defamed individual’s involvement in incidental politi-
cal engagement lacks a dominant role.  First, the format of the activity
is paramount.  Here, the Gallup organization chose eighty-two unde-
cided voters from the New York area,214 thereby reaching into a pool
that is specified yet large.  This format precluded some civic-duty par-
ticipants from participating because the selected individuals were not
published until the beginning of the process.  Second, the goal of the
moderator is predetermined.  In the debate Fenton participated in, the
goal of the moderator was to give the conversation direction and en-
sure questions get answered.215  That goal was achieved by monitor-
ing the political candidates and the civic-duty participants.  Third and
fourth, the order of when the participants would be chosen to ask a
question and the manner in which the participant must conduct them-
selves before, during, and after the question was preset.  In this case,
212. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 352 (1974) (indicating the lawyer
was not a public figure because he played a minimal role at the coroner’s in-
quest); see also King, supra note 20, at 667 (indicating  that the existence of a R
public controversy—and the plaintiff’s central role with it—is essential even in
the recognition of voluntary public figures).
213. See Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publ’ns, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(defining public figure).
214. See October 3, 2012 Debate Transcript, COMM’N ON PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES (Oct. 3,
2012), http://www.debates.org/index.php?page=october-3-2012-debate-transcript,
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/D2JR-69AD (indicating the procedure for choos-
ing civic-duty participants for the 2nd presidential debate).
215. Id.
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Fenton was the fourth of eleven persons to ask a question; her respon-
sibility was simply to ask a question and take her seat, which she did.
In fact, after each candidate answered the question posed, the moder-
ator moved on to the next civic-duty participant to ask another ques-
tion.216  As a result, the actions of civic-duty participants and the
degree of public attention that developed from participating in fleeting
activities in this political event precluded them from exercising domi-
nance and activating a limited-purpose public-figure status.
When a private person accepts a government job, and an invitation
to speak as a civic-duty participant is based on the title or duties of
that job, there generally is no substantial public controversy to volun-
tarily interject oneself into.  As the U.S. Department of Agriculture
Director of Rural Development for Georgia at the time of the defama-
tory statement, Shirley Sherrod was asked to address attendees at a
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP)
Freedom Fund dinner.  Some may consider involvement with this or-
ganization synonymous to political engagement.  In accepting this in-
vitation as a civic duty, her speech was a personal life story to urge
poor people, white and black, to pull together and overcome racial di-
visions.217  The content and the context in which she was speaking
was not derived from any real or implied pervasive fame on the topic
of race relations.  The NAACP narrowed her audience to attendees
only.  Also, there was no assumption that her participation in commu-
nity and professional affairs gave her special prominence or the ability
to gain access to the media.218
In concluding that the above-mentioned private civic-duty partici-
pants are limited by the constraints of the entity they are involved
with, it is important to consider the nature and extent of their partici-
pation.  As a general rule, society does not scrutinize the activities of
civic-duty participants who engage in routine governmental commit-
tee meetings, jury service, and inconsequential political engagements.
These activities have not been labeled activities of public concern or
public controversies.  Jurors are drawn into a public forum largely by
lot due to a jury summons system,219 yet their role in the trial is tran-
216. See id.
217. Shirley Sherrod, Open Letter from Shirley Sherrod: You and I Can’t Yield—Not
Now, Not Ever, NAACP (Aug. 17, 2010), http://www.naacp.org/news/entry/you-
and-i-cant-yield-not-now-not-ever, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/E7AC-J5HN.
218. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 352 (1974) (indicating the Court would
not lightly assume that a citizen’s participation in community and professional
affairs rendered him a public figure for all purposes).
219. See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 457 (1976) (indicating while partici-
pants in some litigation may be legitimate “public figures,” either generally or for
the limited purpose of that litigation, the majority will more likely resemble re-
spondent, drawn into a public forum largely against their will in order to attempt
to obtain the only redress available to them or to defend themselves against ac-
tions brought by the State or by others).
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sitory.  A civic-duty participant’s role in an inconsequential political
engagement or routine congressional meetings/hearings is only dis-
sipating or fleeting relative to the substantial ramifications of govern-
ment activities.  A speech by a government employee made outside of
the role of government employment is also trivial.  Therefore, the ac-
tivities from these civic duties are limited by the agency, court system,
or organization and do not allow civic-duty participants to shape
events in areas of concern to society at large.
B. Civic-Duty Participants Are Not Public Figures
The general responsibilities of private civic-duty participants do
not fit within the definitions of all-purpose and limited-purpose public
figures for purposes of defamation law. Gertz identified categories
that fall short of logic and are inapplicable to civic-duty participants.
Gertz described the limited-purpose public figure in two ways.  The
opinion defined a limited-purpose public figure as “an individual [who]
voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a particular public contro-
versy and thereby becomes a public figure for a limited range of is-
sues.”220  But, Gertz goes on to say, “[I]n either case such persons
assume special prominence in the resolution of public questions.”221
The first definition for limited-purpose public figure is separated by
the disjunctive conjunction of “or.”  Conversely, the add-on sentence
results in a linguistic conundrum.  Specifically, “or” in this context
may be inclusive or exclusive; the descriptions set forth two quite dis-
tinct meanings.  However, the progeny of Gertz sheds light on where
the emphasis should lie.  The trilogy opinions accentuate “thrust”
more than coercion,222 thereby placing more weight on the thrusting
element in the definition and excluding the assumption of special
prominence in the resolution of public questions.  Thus, for private
civic-servant participants, this recognition concedes, at least to some
extent, a forceful intrusion activates the limited-purpose public figure,
which is not the essence of civic responsibility.
Civic-duty participants are not all-purpose public figures—not only
because they are not intimately involved in the resolution of impor-
tant public questions or, by reason of their fame, shaping events in
areas of societal concern,223 but because the conditions around a con-
troversy are weighed against this premise.  The Supreme Court has
not explicitly defined public controversy, but even in declaring what
public controversy is not, there is no impact on the limited responsibil-
220. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351 (emphasis added).
221. Id.
222. See Wolston v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, Inc., 443 U.S. 157, 166 (1979); Hutchinson
v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 135 (1979); Firestone, 424 U.S. at 454.
223. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 336–37 (citing Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 162
(1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring)).
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ities of civic-duty participants.  According to Gertz and its progeny,
their participation must be more than minimal.224  In addition, the
content, form, and context of a defamatory attack on civic-duty partici-
pants constantly delineates a remedy for this problem and cancels out
an all-purpose public-figure determination.  Below is a resuscitation of
the same instances above, but here the specific circumstances are ana-
lyzed from the perspective of public-figure status.
1. Routine Congressional Meetings/Hearings
Participating in a routine congressional meeting or hearing does
not render a private civic-duty participant a public figure.  The meth-
odology for participating in this type of civic involvement precludes
one from interjecting into a vortex of controversy,225 and absent a sub-
poena, it precludes one from being coerced into a controversy.226
Civic-duty participants are not volunteering to take a position of po-
tential public influence such that they are assuming a risk of in-
jury.227  By participating, they would be hard pressed to believe that
their fleeting involvement would allow them the prestige to call a
press conference for media redress in the case of a media contro-
versy.228  Because civic duties are limited in scope, civic-duty partici-
pants are unable to voluntarily inject, thrust, or draw attention
towards their involvement in accordance with the Gertz requirements.
Categorizing a responsibility or activity at a congressional hearing
for a civic-duty participant as beyond trivial or tangential participa-
tion is the only way to achieve a public figure classification, but it is
not workable to relabel activities for this sole purpose. Dun & Brad-
street had problems defining public concern; to relabel this measure-
ment of activity would catapult defamation law into a greater identity
crisis.  Although Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts attempted to establish
a formula to measure activity, it was in an ad hoc fashion to establish
an end result of reclassifying a private individual to a limited-purpose
public figure.  If used today, this method would necessitate substan-
tial proof showing that the civic-duty participant attempted to influ-
224. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352 (“[I]t is preferable to reduce the public-figure question to a
more meaningful context by looking to the nature and extent of an individual’s
participation in the particular controversy giving rise to the defamation.”).
225. See id. at 344 (“[P]ublic figures have thrust themselves to the forefront of particu-
lar public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues
involved.”).
226. Id. at 345.
227. See id. (indicating those who assume the risk have “assumed roles of especial
prominence in the affairs of society”).
228. See id. at 344 (“[P]ublic officials and public figures usually enjoy significantly
greater access to the channels of effective communication and hence have a more
realistic opportunity to counteract false statements than private individuals nor-
mally enjoy.”).
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ence the outcome or realistically could have been expected to influence
an outcome of a controversy.  But this proof cannot be achieved with
the limited responsibilities assigned to civic-duty participants.  As it
relates to congressional hearings, the witness rules cannot be materi-
ally altered to establish more than a fact-finding expedition amongst
witnesses.
In spite of the potential newsworthiness of some congressional
hearings, calumnious news reporting on routine congressional wit-
nesses generally does not include assertions on subject matters that
are within the context of public controversy.229  The context of public
controversy, drawn from Dun & Bradstreet, is required.  In the in-
stance where Rush Limbaugh made defamatory assertions, his conclu-
sions about the potential witness were not of public controversy or
concern.  He chose to take unreasonable inferences from Ms. Fluke’s
testimony to entertain his listening audience, increase ratings, and
please sponsors.230  This is the type of defamatory attack that was not
free and robust debate on public issues or meaningful dialogue of
ideas concerning self-government.231  This particular interest, accord-
ing to Dun & Bradstreet, warrants no special protection when the
speech is wholly false and clearly damaging to Fluke’s reputation.232
Limbaugh directly defamed a civic-duty participant who was not nec-
essarily at the center of a public controversy.  His goal, in making in-
ferences from her speech, did not regard public controversy and,
therefore, his attack was towards a private individual, not a public
figure.
In analyzing the content of the published information and the
weight to be applied, conflicting interpretations also preclude civic-
duty participants who are involved in routine congressional hearings
from being classified as public figures for several reasons.  First, con-
flicting interpretations about the involuntary public figure status, rec-
229. See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454–55 (1976) (“Dissolution of a mar-
riage through judicial proceedings is not the sort of ‘public controversy’ referred
to in Gertz . . . .  Her actions, both in instituting the litigation and in its conduct,
were quite different from those of General Walker in Curtis Publishing Co. . . . .
She assumed no ‘special prominence in the resolution of public questions.’” (quot-
ing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351)).
230. See John Nolte, Left-Wing Politico Busted Fudging Limbaugh Ratings, FOX NA-
TION (May 24, 2012), http://nation.foxnews.com/rush-limbaugh/2012/05/24/left-
wing-politico-busted-fudging-limbaugh-ratings, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/
48YT-KXR9 (showing Arbitron ratings provided by an industry source); see also
Rush Limbaugh vs. Sandra Fluke, supra note 5 (discussing Limbaugh’s online R
public apologies where approximately forty-five advertisers withdrew from his
radio talk show as sources).
231. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 760 (1985).
232. Id. at 762 (“[T]his particular interest warrants no special protection when—as in
this case—the speech is wholly false and clearly damaging to the victim’s busi-
ness reputation.”).
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ognized in Gertz, necessitate that the designation of involuntary
public figures leads inevitably to considerations of the nature of the
content of the communication.233 This inference legitimizes involun-
tariness as an option for valuable consideration.  Although this status
was immediately shunned after it was mentioned in Gertz, the reality
exists that involuntary public figures become public figures through
no purposeful action of their own.  But this determination cannot be
made without considering the content of the communications.  Accord-
ingly, when Rush Limbaugh called Fluke “a slut” and a “prostitute,”
the content of his harmful, sensational reporting was not about the
Oversight and Government Reform Committee barring a witness on
the subject of women’s rights.  On the contrary, the content was a vo-
ciferous and inappropriate use of language based on no purposeful act
of Fluke’s to warrant the defamation.  The weight of the foul language
cannot be applied to any public concern.
The second reason why the content and weight of calumnious news
reporting cannot be applied to a public figure status for civic-duty par-
ticipants is because these communications lack the content, form, and
context required by Dun & Bradstreet. This case relied on precedent
that defined public concern “by [the expression’s] content, form, and
context . . . as revealed by the whole record.”234  In examining the pub-
lic-concern inquiry as a threshold precondition, the content of calum-
nious news reporting is generally insignificant to the parameters of
the actual public controversy.  In the Fluke incident, the parameter of
requiring Catholic universities and charities to include birth control in
their health coverage was the actual controversy.  Yet, Limbaugh’s
form of speech was of malicious composition, and parts of the dis-
course that surrounded his words constituted defamation per se.235
His intent was solely motivated by the desire for profit,236 and more
importantly, to advance the voice of the conservatives listening to his
syndicated radio news talk show.237  Thus, the content and weight of
233. See King, supra note 20, at 672 (arguing that “[t]he involuntary public figure R
classification has contributed to the reemergence of content-based analysis” be-
cause “an alleged defamatory statement must relate to a public contro-
versy . . . [t]hat necessarily leads to considerations of content”).
234. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 761 (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147–48
(1983)).
235. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 569 (1977); see also Lisa R. Pruitt, “On the
Chastity of Women All Property in the World Depends”: Injury from Sexual Slan-
der in the Nineteenth Century, 78 IND. L. J. 965 (2003) (discussing conceptions of
harm associated with defamation law, particularly in sexual slander cases).
236. See Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 762 (indicating the speech, “like advertising, is
hardy and unlikely to be deterred by incidental state regulation” because “[i]t is
solely motivated by the desire for profit, which, [the Court] noted, is a force less
likely to be deterred than others”).
237. LIMBAUGH, supra note 27, at 303 (“I am convinced that the most important thing R
conservatives have to do to win is to just keep saying no to the left.  No to their
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his calumnious news reporting does not impact the civic-duty partici-
pant’s status when viewed from an involuntary public figure stand-
point, nor any other public figure standpoints.
For the reasons stated above, civic-duty participants testifying in
routine congressional hearings and meetings are not public figures.
Courts, left with their own interpretation of the nature of the content,
would deny public-figure status to these participants based on a
formula that would balance the nature of the civic responsibility with
the present legal rubric of defamation.  The calumnious news report-
ing must be significant to the parameters of a public concern and the
role of the civic-duty participant.  Without the calumnious news re-
porting being germane to the civic responsibility, and with the lack of
voluntarily injection and a more than trivial involvement, most courts
would be obligated to reject such a classification.
2. Jury Service
Jurors who do not recoil from the responsibility of civic duty upon
receiving a jury summons are not public figures.  Similar to civic-duty
participants providing congressional testimony, there is no general
public concern inherent to a routine trial, nor do jurors voluntarily
inject themselves into a particular public controversy.238  They, like
the plaintiff in Firestone, are not public figures as a result of being
participants in litigation.239  In fact, they are figures less public than
the parties to the litigation because they were drawn into the legal
forum by a jury summons and the voir dire process.240  While they
have or can be expected to have a major impact on the resolution of a
specific trial with foreseeable and substantial ramifications for
others,241 they are neither the central figures in a significant public
controversy, nor did they seek to publicize their views on the relevant
controversy.242
special-interest giveaways.  No to their pork-barrel spending projects.  No to their
privileged congressional empire.  If we can just deny them the fuel that runs their
corrupt empire, it will wither away just like the communist empire did.”).
238. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974) (indicating that one can
become a public figure for a limited purpose if one “voluntarily injects oneself or
is drawn into a particular public controversy”).
239. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 457 (1976).
240. See id. (“[W]hile participants in some litigation may be legitimate ‘public figures,’
either generally or for the limited purpose of that litigation, the majority will
more likely resemble respondent, drawn into a public forum largely against their
will in order to attempt to obtain the only redress available to them or to defend
themselves against actions brought by the State or by others.”).
241. See Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publ’ns, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(defining public figure for limited purposes).
242. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351 (requiring special prominence in the resolution of pub-
lic questions); see also Wells v. Liddy, 186 F.3d 505, 539–40 (4th Cir. 1999) (indi-
cating the defendant must put forth evidence that the plaintiff has been the
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Both an unconventional and conventional analysis is needed when
examining calumnious news reporting on jurors, who are members of
a small group.  The unconventional analysis, notwithstanding the ap-
pearance of a right-of-privacy analysis, consists of understanding the
rationale of protecting jurors’ status as private persons.  Some courts
used this rationale in weighing the public controversy in denying a
motion to release names and addresses of jurors to the press to pre-
vent reasonably foreseeable defamatory publications.243  In United
States v. Wecht,244 an acclaimed forensic pathologist was indicted, and
local television stations and newspapers covered the execution of the
warrants.245  The pathologist asserted his indictment was “drafted as
much for media attention as legal merit” and that the U.S. Attorney
“personally contributed to the extensive media exposure by calling a
highly unusual press conference which was widely attended by the
media.”246  An ancillary dispute occurred in this case, however, when
the Board of Judges for the Western District of Pennsylvania entered
an administrative order directing that all jurors be identified in court
only by assigned juror numbers, and all juror lists generated would be
deemed confidential property of the Court.247  This order activated an
appeal to the Third Circuit.248  The lower court’s position measured
the weight of the potential public controversy over the release of
names and addresses of jurors.  It was believed by the Board of Judges
that the press would disseminate news stories that would negatively
impact the jurors’ willingness to serve and hinder their inability to
remain fair, impartial, and focused on the case.249
Although the unconventional analysis in Welch was made prior to
the vast, sensational calumnious news reporting by the 24-hour news
media of today, the rationale of the trial court is consistent with the
need to protect jurors.  Nevertheless, the Third Circuit held that when
contrasted with the media’s First Amendment right to access to trial
proceedings, the lower court must be able to show “that denying the
names and addresses of jurors outweighs the value of openness.”250
regular focus of media reports to prove that the plaintiff is a central figure in the
controversy).
243. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 68 (1971) (Harlen, J., dissent-
ing), abrogated by Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (“[I]nfliction of
harm through the exercise of freedom of speech and the press to which the Con-
stitution gives explicit protection, recoverable damages must be limited to those
consequences of the publication which are reasonably foreseeable.”).
244. 537 F.3d 222 (3rd Cir. 2008).
245. Id. at 224–25.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 226.
249. Id. at 264 (J. Van Antwerpern, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
250. Id. at 263 (J. Van Antwerpern, concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing
Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501, 509 (1984)).
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In spite of the ruling, judges in various jurisdictions faced with the
same dilemma rely on the same argument: protect the jury when de-
famatory injury is foreseeable.  They believe that in releasing vital in-
formation of jurors, an alternative consequence may occur; therefore,
they delay the release of information until the public controversy be-
comes stale.251  The reasonably foreseeable theory temporarily pre-
vents jurors from being treated like public figures.  It protects jurors
from potential harm after weighing the public controversy over releas-
ing the names and addresses of jurors with the consequences of de-
famatory publications.  Therefore, it maintains the private individual
classification as long as possible.
While some debate continues to brew as to whether the right to
access names and addresses of jurors is privileged by the media, an
affirmative response does not alter their status from private persons
to public figures.  The Supreme Court has held that the right of media
access to jurors’ names is not absolute; courts may apply restrictions
to protect their overriding interests.252  The State’s justification in de-
nying access must be a weighty one.253  For example, in cases in which
preverdict access to jury information is considered, a restriction on ac-
cess may be granted only if the restriction is: (1) necessitated by a
compelling government interest, and (2) narrowly tailored to serve
that interest.254  In cases where postverdict access to the names and
addresses of jurors is sought, two competing interests are generally
asserted in opposition to access: (1) the jurors’ right to privacy and
freedom from media harassment after the conclusion of their service;
and (2) the concern that freedom of debate and independence of
thought central to impartial jury deliberations will be stifled if jurors
know their individual arguments and ballots might be disclosed by fel-
low jurors contacted by the media.255  However, in either instance, if it
is determined that the rights of the jurors’ information does not over-
251. Order Granting in Part Motion to Intervene for the Limited Purpose of Seeking
Release of Juror Information Once Jury Is Discharged, State v. Anthony, No.
2008CF015606, 2011 WL 3112070 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 26, 2011).
252. See Robert Lloyd Raskopf, A First Amendment Right of Access to a Juror’s Iden-
tity: Toward a Fuller Understanding of the Jury’s Deliberative Process, 17 PEPP.
L. REV. 357, 374 (1990) (highlighting that this is the case even when a first
amendment right of access is found to exist).
253. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for Norfolk Cnty., 457 U.S. 596, 606
(1982) (“[T]he circumstances under which the press and public can be barred
from a criminal trial are limited; the State’s justification in denying access must
be a weighty one.”).
254. Id. at 606–07.
255. Raskopf, supra note 252, at 375 (citing Note, The First Amendment and Post- R
Verdict Interviews, 20 COLUM. J.L. LAW & SOC. PROBS. 203, 231–33 (1986); Public
Disclosures of Jury Deliberations, 96 HARV. L. REV. 886, 888–92 (1983)).
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ride the qualified First Amendment right of access,256 it can be
straightforwardly asserted that there is no lack of a free, uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open debate when calumnious news reporting is im-
minent.  Although not the strongest argument, an alternative may in-
clude some reasonable safeguarding to preserve the human dignity of
victims of the calumnious speech.257  This action treats jurors as pri-
vate individuals and not as public figures.
The prevention of intrusion on jurors has also continued to be seen
in high profile and televised criminal cases in America.  In the infa-
mous cases State v. Anthony and State v. Zimmerman, the judges be-
lieved the local and national media organizations that gave the case so
much attention would likely seek out those jurors.258  Recalling the
incidents after the Anthony trial,259 the judge in Zimmerman ruled
that jurors’ identities would be kept secret for an undetermined period
with a subsequent decision to be made as to when their names could
be made public.260  Not only did the defense attorney ask to extend the
anonymity,261 the judge believed it was an inherent duty to protect
court participants, especially those participating because of civic duty
rather than voluntarily.262  Specifically, this local court made a deter-
mination that the jurors, as a whole, were still private individuals.
Prior to this case, the judge in the Anthony trial ordered a delay in
releasing the names of the jurors and condemned the media.  He said
the broadcast of the Anthony trial “devolved into cheap, soap opera-
like entertainment” and the Florida Public Records Law had “become
256. See Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court of California for Riverside Cnty. (Press-
Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1, 9 (1986) (“[T]he trial court must determine whether the
situation is such that the rights of the accused override the qualified First
Amendment right of access.”).
257. Id. at 9–10 (citing Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984)) (“[T]he presump-
tion may be overcome only by an overriding interest based on findings that clo-
sure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that
interest. The interest is to be articulated along with findings specific enough that
a reviewing court can determine whether the closure order was properly
entered.”)
258. Amy Pavuk & Anthony Colarossi, Anthony Jurors Unreachable After Names
Made Public, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Oct 25, 2011, at A4; Yamiche Alcindor, Judge:
Zimmerman Jurors’ Names to Stay Secret for Now, USA TODAY, June 17, 2013,
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2013/06/17/george-zimmerman-hearing-
continues-monday/2432571/, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/U5ZF-Y5QN.
259. Pavuk & Colarossi, supra note 258 (indicating the judge recalled that many, if R
not all, people were outraged and distressed by the verdict, and were not hesitant
to show their contempt for the jurors).
260. Id. See Order Granting in Part Motion to Intervene for the Limited Purpose of
Seeking Release of Juror Information Once Jury Is Discharged, supra note 251.
261. Rene Stutzman, Will Jurors in Zimmerman Trial Remain Anonymous? It’s Possi-
ble, ORLANDO SENTINEL, July 14, 2013, at A4.
262. Order Granting in Part Motion to Intervene for the Limited Purpose of Seeking
Release of Juror Information Once Jury Is Discharged, supra note 251.
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simply a tool to sell a story.”263  In fact, he took the position that “the
Legislature must examine whether an exemption barring release of
jurors’ names, albeit limited to specific, rare cases, is needed in order
to protect the safety and well-being of those citizens willing to
serve.”264
The matter of defaming jurors, who are members of a small group,
also warrants a conventional defamation analysis of the expression’s
content, form, and context as revealed by the whole record.  This con-
ventional analysis precludes members of a jury, as a whole, from being
classified as public figures.  As mentioned above, serving as a juror is
a voluntary undertaking summoned by an involuntary procedure, and
for defamation purposes, the status of a jury cannot be assessed with-
out considering the content of the defamatory communications.  In
considering the content in the Nancy Grace incident, it cannot be said
that her calumnious news reporting involved the free flow of commer-
cial information.  The defamatory comment did not ensure “uninhib-
ited, robust, and wide-open debate” on public issues.265  The content,
form, and context of her statement that the jury was “kooky” served
only to defend her reporting practices and, therefore, was not relevant
to the merits of the trial, which was the public controversy.  Because
the calumnious statement involved no issue of public concern, the ap-
proach approved in Gertz and the balance of the state’s interest in
compensating private individuals for such harm is in favor of the jury,
but not as public figures.
Moving from the unconventional and conventional analyses, an-
other reason why jurors are not public figures when subjected to ca-
lumnious news reporting is that the mandatory public voir dire
proceedings in the jury selection process, although on public record,
prevent such a designation.  One may argue that the coercion factor in
Gertz, causing one to become a public figure for a limited purpose, is
evident in the voir dire process, thereby drawing one into a particular
public controversy.266  Admittedly, during the voir dire process, the
venire member is forced, under the government’s threat of contempt of
court, to publically reveal private matters.267  Venire persons are
263. Id. at 10–11.
264. Pavuk & Colarossi, supra note 258. R
265. See id.
266. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 352 (1974).
267. See Clinton T. Speegle, The Socially Unpopular Verdict: A Post-Casey Anthony
Analysis of the Need to Reform Juror Privacy Policy, 43 CUMB. L. REV. 259, 269
(2013) (“[T]he venire-member is forced to publically reveal ‘[his] darkest mo-
ments, which [he] may have struggled for years to forget.’”) (quoting Order
Granting in Part Motion to Intervene for the Limited Purpose of Seeking Release
of Juror Information Once Jury is Discharged, supra note 251.
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somewhat powerless against this privacy invasion.268  However, this
type of coercion alone is insufficient to propel the potential juror into a
limited-purpose public-figure classification.  A further reading of Gertz
precludes this from occurring. Gertz makes clear that playing a mini-
mal role precludes a defamed plaintiff from becoming a public fig-
ure.269  Therefore, jurors who are subject to a system that could only
identify or disqualify them for service in a public trial are not public
figures because of their minimal role in the process.
In the Nancy Grace incident, the weight of the calumnious news
reporting did not reclassify the jury from private persons to public
figures.  Nancy Grace was asked by a news broadcast host about her
coverage tactics on the Anthony trial.270  Her response appeared to be
motivated by a personal desire to defend her reporting tactics,271 not
as speech significant to the parameters of the actual trial.  Calling a
jury “kooky” in this manner revealed that the defamatory statement
was not major to the controversial aspects of the trial.  In view of the
fact that she said that she would take the heat for her media coverage
tactics, and the “kooky” jury would not stop her for looking for missing
children and trying to solve unsolved homicides,272 her linguistic form
was to use the word “kooky” as an adjective denoting an informal or
slang term for a mentally irregular person.273  The content of her en-
tire communications was not of public concern, but in fact resembled
mockery, while the broader parts of the discourse that surrounded her
entire statement resembled resentment towards the news broadcast
host who challenged her reporting style.  The communications, as a
whole, neither sought to inform the public that the jury was not dis-
charging its civic responsibilities, nor “brought to light actual or po-
tential wrongdoing or breach of public trust.”274  Therefore, the jurors
in the Anthony case do not qualify for a public figure classification.
268. Id. (“[V]enire persons are powerless against this privacy invasion.”); but see
Brandborg v. Lucas, 891 F. Supp. 352, 360 (E.D. Tex. 1995) (“[A]t voir dire the
court should put the juror on notice concerning their right to non-disclosure of
private matters.”).
269. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352.
270. Nancy Grace Discusses Casey Anthony Trial Verdict, supra note 15. R
271. Id. (“George, I tell the truth.  Am I taking the heat for it?  Yeah.  Is that gonna
make me stop looking for missing children and trying to solve unsolved homi-
cides?  No.  I’m not going to let some kooky jury stop justice.  Not for me
anyway.”)
272. Id.
273. Kooky, THEFREEDICTIONARY.COM, http://www.thefreedictionary.com/kooky (last
visited January 18, 2014), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/KJL9-ZDSK (last vis-
ited January 18, 2014).
274. See Lawrence Rosenthal, Permissible Content Discrimination Under the First
Amendment: The Strange Case of the Public Employee, 25 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
529, 535 (1998) (indicating the question of whether a defendant’s  speech ad-
dresses a matter of public concern “must be determined by the content, form, and
context of a given statement” and can be proven by the test that requires  the
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Because jurors cumulatively play a political function in the admin-
istration of the law,275 it is fundamental that they be protected as pri-
vate individuals from certain intrusions.  Although not generally
persons of notoriety, jurors serve to communicate the spirit of justice
to the minds of all citizens.276  This spirit is what the Supreme Court
acknowledged when it said: “maintenance of the jury as a fact-finding
body is of such importance and occupies so firm a place in our history
and jurisprudence that any seeming curtailment of the right to a jury
trial should be scrutinized with utmost care.”277  Although there has
also been constitutional debate on whether jurors are protected from
the press having access to their names, identities, and addresses,278
this argument furthers the conclusion that they are not public figures.
This fundamental need to protect jurors as a group recognizes a socie-
tal interest involving the rights of private individual citizens to serve
as jurors,279 without exposure to calumnious news reporting.
3. Inconsequential Political Engagement
When one voluntarily thrusts oneself into political engagement, in
the manner that public officials and public figures do, he or she ac-
cepts the necessary consequences of that involvement in the public af-
fairs.280  However, when an individual voluntarily participates in
political engagement in a manner that is inconsequential, like voting
comment to seek to “inform the public that [the defamed person] was not dis-
charging its governmental responsibilities,” nor “bring to light actual or potential
wrongdoing or breach of public trust”).
275. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) (emphasis added) (quoting
Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
276. Taslitz, supra note 211, at 474. R
277. Tom M. Dees, III, Juries: On the Verge of Extinction? A Discussion of Jury Re-
form, 54 SMU L. REV. 1755, 1757 (2001) (quoting Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. West-
over, 359 U.S. 500, 501 (1959)) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also
Austin Wakeman Scott, Trial by Jury and the Reform of Civil Procedure, 31
HARV. L. REV. 669, 676 (1918) (explaining how during the 18th century treatises
extolling the jury “as a bulwark of liberty, as a means of preventing oppression by
the Crown” were common in both England and America).
278. See Scott Sholder, “What’s in A Name?”: A Paradigm Shift from Press-Enterprise
to Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions When Considering the Release of Juror-
Identifying Information in Criminal Trials, 36 AM. J. CRIM. L. 97, 99 (2009) (writ-
ing on the ongoing conflict that arises when the press seeks to obtain the identi-
ties and addresses of jurors in a criminal trial).
279. See John A. Wasleff, Lockhart v. McCree: Death Qualifications as a Determinant
of the Impartiality and Representativeness of a Jury in Death Penalty Cases, 72
CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 1080 (1987) (“[T]he reference to ‘a phase of civic responsi-
bility’ suggests that the definition of a ‘distinctive group’ is grounded partly in a
societal interest involving the rights of citizens to serve as jurors.”).
280. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344–45 (1974) (indicating when an
individual who voluntarily thrusts himself into the public arena, in the manner
that public officials and public figures do, he must accept the necessary conse-
quences resulting from involvement in public affairs).
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or participating in political debates for a question-and-answer session,
they are not subject to the category of all-purpose public figures.  Such
activities only render the political engagement an activity that dissi-
pates when the entire political outcome is complete even though it was
an activity that may have been necessary to help the political process
develop.  The mere attempt to designate persons who incidentally en-
gage in limited political interaction as public figures forges confusion
about the designation itself and on the disjointed public-concern defi-
nition or lack thereof.  Clear evidence of the elements of public-figure
requirements is crucial to public-figure status, but without such evi-
dence, the activity must be considered inconsequential political
engagement.
Fleeting participation in political activities precludes private civic-
duty participants from existing within the parameters of the public
figure category.  The nature and extent of activities by a political can-
didate or chairman of a political party in public political affairs re-
quires one to interject oneself or be drawn into potential public
controversy.”281  Robust as they are, political campaigns are generally
public controversies.  But deeds that dissipate cannot meet the re-
quirement of “thrust” because fleeting participation does not rise to
the level of assuming special prominence in the resolution of public
questions.  More importantly, when a civic-duty participant asks ques-
tions at a political debate, such persons are not accepting the risk of
injury by defamatory falsehood as defined in Gertz.282  This private
civic-duty participant has relinquished no part of his interest in the
protection of his own good name.283
Civic-duty participants are also not public figures even if it is al-
leged they were coerced to participate in trivial or fleeting political
activities.  Trivial or fleeting political activities do not, under Gertz,
amount to a coercion or drawing in of the civic-duty participant into a
particular public controversy.  Generally, others do not force participa-
tion in these dissipating, minimal functions at political events through
pressure, threats, or intimidation.284  The participation is usually in
response to a high value on civic responsibility.285  But, even if it is
281. Id. at 351.
282. Id. at 345 (“[C]ommunications media are entitled to act on the assumption that
public officials and public figures have voluntarily exposed themselves to in-
creased risk of injury from defamatory falsehood concerning them.  No such as-
sumption is justified with respect to a private individual [who has] not accepted
public office or assumed an ‘influential role in ordering society.’” (quoting Curtis
Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967))).
283. Id.
284. Coerce, THEFREEDICTIONARY.COM, http://www.thefreedictionary.com/coerce,
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/V2XG-FEZL (last visited January 25, 2014) (de-
fining coerce as: “To force to act or think in a certain way by use of pressure,
threats, or intimidation; compel”).
285. See Alarco´n, supra note 23. R
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alleged and proven that the concept of civic responsibility is propa-
ganda to brainwash citizens, the activities cannot alter a private indi-
vidual status.  This is because, similar to the discussion of jurors,
Gertz emphasized that a minimal function does not equal public figure
designation.286
In balancing dissipating and incidental political engagement with
the designation of public figure status, a clear perception of public con-
cern and the nature of the defamatory content conclude that private
civic duty participants are not eligible for the category.  In the in-
stance of the calumnious news reporting of the Washington Free Bea-
con, the public controversy was between opposing candidates.  In fact,
the contention between the candidates during the second debate was
based on past controversies between them regarding key issues.287
The civic-duty participant’s input in the question-and-answer debate
was neither germane to the ongoing political controversy, nor was it
the basis of a primary controversy.288  Simply put, her question was
one that was not previously mentioned in the first debate.289  Accord-
ing to one circuit court’s requirement,290 the controversy must have
actually arisen.291  Here, the calumnious news reporting was directed
toward a private person without a preexisting public controversy re-
lating to her question.  What ultimately drew attention was not her
question292 but, rather, the Republican candidate’s response, which
immediately ignited uproar on social media forums and in the
press,293 creating a second public controversy.
286. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352.
287. Tom Cohen, Romney Takes Debate to Obama over Economy, Health Care, CNN
(Oct. 4, 2012, 12:17 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/10/03/politics/debate-main,
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/BP5F-JXNX.
288. 2nd Presidential Debate, STUDENT NEWS DAILY (Oct. 18, 2012), http://www
.studentnewsdaily.com/daily-news-article/2nd-presidential-debate/, archived at
http://perma.unl.edu/EXM8-PAUV (“In what new ways do you intend to rectify
the inequalities in the workplace, specifically regarding females making only 72
percent of what their male counterparts earn?”).
289. October 3, 2012 Debate Transcript, supra note 214 (indicating the questions R
asked and a description of the debate on domestic issues: three on the economy
and one each on health care, the role of government and governing, with an em-
phasis throughout on differences, specifics and choices).
290. Waldbaum v. Fairchild Pub., 627 F.2d 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
291. Wells v. Liddy, 186 F.3d 505, 540 (4th Cir. 1999) (“A public controversy must
have actually arisen that is related to, although not necessarily causally linked,
to [sic] the action.  The involuntary public figure must be recognized as a central
figure during debate over that matter.”).
292. See Matt Viser, Putting ‘Binders’ in Context; Romney Pushed to Recruit Women at
Group’s Behest, BOSTON GLOBE, October 18, 2012, http://www.highbeam.com/doc/
1P2-33776017.html, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/3T6T-4SYR (asking about
inequities in the workplace, with females often earning less than their male
counterparts).
293. See Carla Marinucci, ‘Binders’ Quote Ignites Furor on Social Media, HOUSTON
CHRONICLE, Oct. 18, 2012, http://www.chron.com/news/politics/article/Binders-re-
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When the original intent of a news article is to censure a cause or
public concern and the calumnious news reporting about a civic-duty
participant is incidental to the story, this alone does not make the
civic-duty participant known as a central person to the activity.294
Once again in the Washington Free Beacon incident, prior to the Re-
publican candidate’s statement there was no specific public dispute
involving Fenton that had foreseeable and substantial ramifications
for persons beyond the civic-duty participant herself.295  She did not
publicize her views about the presidential candidates.  In fact, at the
time she asked the question the public controversy over the candi-
date’s response, as identified by the Washington Free Beacon, had not
actually happened.  Her question only set off a response that created a
new focus about the political candidate for voters to assess.  The ca-
lumnious news reporting about her personal attributes, which were
taken out of context, were not relevant to the prior controversy be-
tween the political candidates.  Her incidental political engagement
was not central to the candidates’ views, as they articulated them
before she asked the question.  For that reason, she is not a public
figure.
Knowing that essentially private concerns or disagreements do not
become public controversies simply because they attract attention,296
the next step in determining that private civic-duty participants are
not public figures is to evaluate the content of the defamatory speech.
Whether the calumnious news report about the civic-duty participant
addresses matters of public concern must be determined, although the
participation is a fleeting activity in political affairs.297  Because ca-
lumnious news reporting includes deleterious comments, denigrating
expressions, indecent words, and defamatory statements, these cate-
gories of statements generally do not involve issues of public concern.
Comparatively, in the Washington Free Beacon incident, imparting
mark-ignites-furor-on-social-media-3958155.php, archived at http://perma.unl
.edu/VEA9-9PFX (reporting Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney’s
comment during Tuesday’s presidential debate about gathering “BINDERS FULL of
WOMEN” for possible hires when he was the governor of Massachusetts spiraled
into the social media stratosphere within minutes); cf. Rohter, supra note 14 (re- R
porting on the Joe the Plumber incident when Joe Wurzelbacher, just another
working man, stopped presidential candidate Barack Obama during a political
rally, caused the presidential candidate to make a controversial statement, set
himself on a path to becoming America’s newest media celebrity—and as such
suddenly found himself facing celebrity-level scrutiny).
294. See Wells, 186 F.3d at 540 (indicating that a public controversy must have actu-
ally arisen that is related, although not necessarily causally linked, to the action
and the involuntary public figure must be recognized as a central figure during
debate over that matter).
295. See Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1292 (defining aspects of public concern).
296. Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1296–98.
297. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985)
(citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147–48 (1983)).
35748-neb_93-3 Sheet No. 103 Side A      04/02/2015   08:48:02
35748-neb_93-3 Sheet No. 103 Side A      04/02/2015   08:48:02
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\93-3\NEB304.txt unknown Seq: 54 31-MAR-15 11:41
2015] CALUMNIOUS NEWS REPORTING 743
facts out of context to fabricate an untrue assertion is speech of deni-
grating expressions, not of public concern.  So, by analysis, Dun &
Bradstreet’s adoption of a “public interest or concern” requirement, in-
distinguishable from the “public or general interest” test formulated
in Rosenbloom—the very test that Gertz was expressly meant to sup-
plant298—was based on the reasoning that defamatory statements
that do not involve issues of public concern yield a less compelling
First Amendment interest.299  In this manner, Dun & Bradstreet
gives calumnious news reporters less First Amendment protection
than they enjoyed under either the Rosenbloom plurality or Gertz,300
and leaves civic-duty participants in a better position to maintain the
private-person status and demand a remedy.
The Shirley Sherrod instance discussed above also failed to show
clear evidence of general fame or notoriety in the community and per-
vasive involvement in the affairs of society that would deem her a pub-
lic personality for all aspects of her life.  Her employment in the
governmental office is not sufficient enough to label her an all-purpose
public figure.  She does not meet the test that requires her position in
government to be of such apparent importance that the public has an
independent interest in the qualifications and performance beyond the
general public interest in all governmental employees.  Additionally,
such a conclusion fails a Gertz examination. Gertz holds that it is pref-
erable to reduce the public-figure question to a more meaningful con-
text by looking to the nature and extent of an individual’s
participation in the particular controversy giving rise to the defama-
tion.  In this instance, the NAACP fund dinner was not surrounded by
controversy at the time she gave the speech.  Without first having a
controversy, the nature and extent of her giving a speech is not de-
serving of an analysis in the defamation claim.  Her status as a pri-
vate individual is not altered because it was not derived from speech
involving the affairs of society in the context of notoriety.
Whether creating a controversy by misusing video editing or social
media as a source for calumnious news reporting or directly making
defamatory statements about civic-duty participants involved in polit-
ical activities, the status of the participant is not altered.  When the
unnamed author of the Washington Free Beacon article termed his in-
vestigative reporting skills a “study” of the victim’s personal Twitter
account,301 he did not change the Gertz classifications nor did he
298. Cynthia L. Estlund, Speech on Matters of Public Concern: The Perils of an Emerg-
ing First Amendment Category, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 11–12 (1990).
299. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 757–58.
300. Estlund, supra note 298, at 55 n.65. R
301. See Washington Free Beacon Staff, supra note 47.  This technique, although in- R
novative, allows for the media or other speakers to take tweets or posts out of
context, presumably in the hopes of calling the credibility of the targeted person
into question. See Stafford, supra note 14. R
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change the public controversy standards set by the progeny of Gertz.
The same is applicable for video editing done to manufacture a story.
For civic-duty participants simply engaging in a dissipating or fleeting
civic responsibilities in political affairs, the court is clear that the exis-
tence of a public controversy—and the plaintiff’s central role with it—
is essential even with some recognition of status.302  And it makes no
difference that it was an activity that may have been necessary to help
the political outcome develop.
C. Civic-Duty Participants are Private Individuals
Private civic-duty participants are private individuals for purposes
of defamation and are afforded the opportunity to seek legal redress
when they are faced with calumnious news reporting. Gertz and its
progeny presented this conclusion by reasoning that defamatory state-
ments do not materially advance society’s interest in “uninhibited, ro-
bust, and wide-open” debate on public issues.303  The instances of
calumnious news reporting illustrated above clearly demonstrate no
potential interference with a meaningful dialogue of ideas concerning
self-government.  Therefore, the media does not have First Amend-
ment protection when it reports calumnious news stories that assault
a civic-duty participant as they participate in dissipating responsibili-
ties especially when and the original intent of the news article is actu-
ally to censure another cause or public concern.  The resultant
behavior warrants compensation particularly because the conse-
quences of calumnious news reporting abandons civic-duty partici-
pants as collateral damage although they have not relinquished any
part of their interest in the protection of their own good name.304
1. Routine Congressional Meetings/Hearings
In determining that an individual should not be deemed a public
personality for all aspects of his or her life,305 Justice Powell, in Gertz,
sought to prevent private persons from losing their status.  For him, it
was preferable to reduce the public-figure question to a more mean-
ingful context by looking to the nature and extent of an individual’s
participation in the particular controversy giving rise to the defama-
302. See King, supra note 20, at 667 (indicating that the existence of a public contro- R
versy—and the plaintiff’s central role within it—is essential even in the recogni-
tion of voluntary public figures).
303. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974).
304. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345 (indicating the plaintiff has relinquished no part of his
interest in the protection of his own good name, and consequently he has a more
compelling call on the courts for redress of injury inflicted by defamatory
falsehood).
305. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352.
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tion.306  So, in the Fluke incident, Justice Powell would have agreed
that evidence was lacking that she was cloaked in general fame or
notoriety before she gave her testimony at a congressional meeting.
Additionally, he would have determined that this civic-duty partici-
pant neither thrust herself into the vortex of a public controversy nor
did she engage the public’s attention in an attempt to influence its
outcome.307  Rather, he would say that Fluke played a minimal role
and her participation related solely to her representation as a private
individual.
According to Firestone, Hutchinson, and Wolston, private-person
witnesses at congressional hearings do not meet the criteria for status
change when importance is placed on the subject matter of the state-
ment and the status of the defamed private civic-duty participant is
devalued.  Under these cases, theoretically, the primary task is to iso-
late the public controversy, then consider the civic-duty participant’s
involvement in it.  A routine congressional meeting with testimony
triggers no public controversy in spite of the newsworthiness regard-
ing the reason for the hearing.308  The civic-duty participant’s involve-
ment in it is not the primary weight to be placed on the matter; his or
her role is secondary.
According to many statements of Supreme Court justices, the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution does not protect delib-
erate, malicious character assassinations.309  With the subject matter
being so prevalent, according to the trilogy,310 Limbaugh’s statements
instantly fall in that category of unprotected speech.  Defamation of a
private individual by the mass media is not one of the occasions for
unfettered ad hoc balancing.311 Dun & Bradstreet recognized defama-
tory speech as far more limited when the concerns that activated New
306. Id.
307. See id. (indicating that the plaintiff played a minimal role at the coroner’s in-
quest, his participation related solely to his representation of a private client, he
took no part in the criminal prosecution of Officer Nuccio, he never discussed
either the criminal or civil litigation with the press, he plainly did not thrust
himself into the vortex of this public issue, nor did he engage the public’s atten-
tion in an attempt to influence its outcome).
308. See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454–55 (1976) (indicating that dissolu-
tion of a marriage through judicial proceedings is not the sort of “public contro-
versy” referred to in Gertz . . . and her actions, both in instituting the litigation
and in its conduct, were quite different from those of General Walker in Curtis
Publishing Co., and she assumed no “special prominence” in the resolution of
public questions).
309. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 785 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
310. See Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979);
Wolston v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, Inc., 443 U.S. 157 (1979).
311. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 81 (1971).(Marshall, J., dissenting).
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York Times and Gertz are absent.312  In this case, Dun & Bradstreet
adds, “[t]here is no threat to the free and robust debate of public is-
sues; there is no potential interference with a meaningful dialogue of
ideas concerning self-government; and there is no threat of liability
causing a reaction of self-censorship by the press.”313  Thus, according
to gratis dicta from five justices and controlling precedent, when a pri-
vate female civic duty participant is called a “slut” by the media, after
members of Congress invited her to educate them on the importance of
contraception for women under the new healthcare law, such harmful
and sensational reporting does not advance society’s interest nor re-
verse her status.
2. Jury Service
Participating in a jury system does not change the private person
status of private civic duty participants.  From a defamation law per-
spective, the Restatement (Second) of Torts reads that jurors partici-
pate in judicial proceedings as a public duty.314  So amalgamating the
private person status of a jury serving a public duty with the individ-
ual interest of the speaker precludes an analysis of general or public
interest and the subsequent transformation of status.  In the Nancy
Grace incident, comparable to the holding in Dun & Bradstreet, de-
fending herself to another reporter is excluded from matters of public
concern because the speech was predominantly in the realm of mat-
ters of personal and economic concern.315  Focusing primarily on the
content of her statement, this speech involved a subject of purely pri-
vate concern and does not relate to a matter of public importance
thereby restricting the applicability of Gertz, which impacts matters of
public or general importance.316  For that reason it does not trigger
the secondary analysis to considering altering the role of the civic-
duty participant jurors.
312. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 759 (1985)
(indicating the role of the Constitution in regulating state libel law is far more
limited when the concerns that activated New York Times and Gertz are absent).
313. Id. at 760.
314. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 589 (1977) (indicating that a member of a
grand or petit jury is absolutely privileged to publish defamatory matter concern-
ing another in the performance of his function as a juror, if the defamatory mat-
ter has some relation to the proceedings in which he is acting as juror).
315. See Dun & Bradstreet Inc., 472 U.S. at 787 (showing Justice Powell’s opinion
excluded the subject matter of credit reports from matters of public concern be-
cause the speech was predominantly in the realm of matters of economic
concern).
316. Id. at 774 (referring to the application of Gertz to deal with a matter of public
importance).
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3. Inconsequential Political Engagement
When private individuals accept government jobs, one may per-
haps infer that their job duties or extra activities are synonymous
with political engagement; however, this misconception does not initi-
ate transformation of the private-individual status. Gertz, Hutchin-
son, and Hepp are examples of how mere employment or participation
in a particular venture is not enough to alter a private person sta-
tus.317  Similar to the plaintiffs in these cases, Shirley Sherrod plainly
neither thrust herself into the vortex of the public controversy, nor did
she engage the public’s attention in an attempt to influence its out-
come when she gave a speech at the NAACP event.  Rather, her func-
tions were minimal as a guest speaker at an organization’s lunch.  Her
private-figure status must be given carte blanche exclusion from the
media’s privilege.  Thus, mere employment and a misconceived under-
standing of that position do not affect a private-person status.
Private civic-duty participants do not relinquish part of their inter-
est in their own good name and their private-person status when they
fulfill a civic responsibility.  Generally, they do not voluntarily inject
themselves into a particular public controversy; they simply step into
areas of need to help facilitate government.  They do not have availa-
ble opportunities usually enjoyed by public officials to rebut defama-
tory comments.318  Their contributions to society far outweigh the
advancement to society’s interest that calumnious news reporting of-
fers.  They have little individual or business interest in the offering of
their time or service towards Congress, juries, or political engage-
ments.  However, when they are directly or indirectly attacked by ca-
lumnious news reporting, it is either for the business interest of the
media or their specific news audience.  Since this is not a meaningful
dialogue of ideas concerning self-government, Gertz and its progeny
allow for defamatory redress for civic duty participants to look like
this:
317. In Gertz, the plaintiff was a lawyer; in Hutchinson, the plaintiff was a research
director and professor; and in Hepp, the plaintiff was the principal stockholder of
General Programming, Inc. (GPI), a corporation that franchises a chain of stores.
318. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 362–63 (1974) (indicating that First
Amendment values are of no less significance when media reports concern pri-
vate persons’ involvement in matters of public concern, but refusing to provide
the same level of constitutional protection that has been afforded the media in
the context of defamation of public persons because the private individual does
not have the same degree of access to the media to rebut defamatory comments as
does the public person).
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Private
individuals Public Officials and Public Figures
triggered when Involuntary All-purpose Limited-purpose
speech is wholly public figures public figures public figures
false and clearly
damaging to the
victim’s business exceedingly rare pervasive fame voluntarily
reputation, or instance or notoriety for injects oneself or
triggered when all purposes and coerced but > a
speech solely in in all contexts minimal role
the individual +
interest of the assumed the
speaker and its risk and have
specific business access to “self-
audience help”
triggered when
the subject
matter = public
concern
V. CONCLUSION
The meaning of public interest and the discernible status of plain-
tiffs under Gertz and its progeny is not as blurred when a media privi-
lege is asserted against defamation claims by civic-duty participants.
Traditionally, this was usually the case, but defamation decisions—
starting with Gertz and on to its progeny—made the task increasingly
difficult once the plaintiff’s status was beyond that of a public offi-
cial.319  In such a case, the reasons for the lack of complications are
fourfold.  First, civic-duty participants are usually implicated in mat-
ters that so narrowly dribble into the public interest or public concern
that the privilege expanded by Gertz and its progeny are not applica-
ble.  Second, the public-figure classification and its unstructured con-
straints, particularly with respect to the public-figure subcategories,
are not applicable to civic-duty participants who have not obtained
pervasive fame or notoriety or who do not voluntarily thrust them-
selves into a public controversy and assume the risk, or when the sub-
ject matter is not of public concern.  Third, although there has been
little guidance by the Court in defining public controversy so as to
serve as a funnel for all persons and situations, the direction on what
319. See King, supra, note 20, at 661 (indicating that the problem has come in the R
attempts by the Supreme Court and lower courts to delineate the scope of consti-
tutional restrictions on defamation once we have passed beyond claims by public
officials).
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was not public concern and when the controversy must start excludes
the dissipating activities of civic-duty participants.  Fourth, evaluat-
ing the content of the speech usually results in a finding that calumni-
ous news reporting does not help shape events in areas of concern to
society at large.  These four reasons solidify the private individual sta-
tus of civic-duty participants.  Therefore, private citizens who want to
engage in civic responsibilities, by invitation or mandate, may seek
legal redress against the media for calumnious news reporting ensu-
ing from their participation because they are not public figures.
